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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past four years, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) has, as it has done since its 
establishment in 1982, exercised its jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1295(a)(5)2 to review decisions of the United States Court of 
International Trade (“CIT”) regarding U.S. regulation of 
international trade.  While trade cases currently make up only about 
six percent of the docket of the Federal Circuit,3 decisions in these 
cases can have a significant discernable impact on the day-to-day 
investigation and regulation of trade matters of the three U.S. 
agencies featured most prominently in the trade decisions of the 
Federal Circuit—United States Customs and Border Protection 
(“Customs”), the United States Department of Commerce 
(“Commerce”), and the United States International Trade 
Commission (“ITC” or “Commission”)—and on the parties involved 
in trade disputes before these agencies. 
This article covers all cases decided by the Federal Circuit in 2006, 
and selected cases from 2003-2005, dealing with international trade 
matters from tariff classification to investigations of dumping and 
subsidies, and jurisdictional issues related to appeals of these matters.  
A significant number of the cases that arrive at the Federal Circuit 
from the CIT are accompanied by a complex history4—sometimes 
described as “a long and tortuous path”5—and the case summaries 
below highlight the major holdings of each case within the context of 
this history and the unique fact patterns encompassing each case. 
I. U.S. CUSTOMS LAWS 
As fewer unfair trade investigations involving Commerce and the 
ITC were initiated and appealed between 2003 and 2006, customs 
enforcement cases represent the largest number of trade regulation 
cases decided by the Federal Circuit during this period.  Customs has 
been an agency within the United States Department of Homeland 
Security since 2003.  While Customs currently has many functions 
                                                          
 2. “The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of an appeal from a final decision of the United States Court of 
International Trade.”  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2000). 
 3. Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 4. See Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1345, 1346-47 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (noting that “[l]ike many appeals from the Court of International Trade, this 
appeal has a somewhat complex history”). 
 5. See Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1244, 1245 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (indicating that the dispute began in 1995 and subsequently included 
three rulings by the Court of International Trade and one ruling by the Federal 
Circuit). 
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related to security, as well as trade, the focus of the Customs trade 
cases at the Federal Circuit involve Customs’ functions of “[a]ssessing 
and collecting Customs duties, excise taxes, fees and penalties due on 
imported merchandise.”6  As a result, during 2003-2006 Customs 
found itself defending in the Federal Circuit a significant number of 
tariff classification decisions and had to defend a wide range of other 
customs-related matters, including deemed liquidation, duty 
drawback, and Byrd Amendment distributions.  In addition, as 
discussed below, a large number of 2006 Customs cases involved 
jurisdictional issues. 
A. Tariff Classification 
While the majority of Customs’ tariff classification decisions 
necessarily turn on the details of the products being imported, 
classification decisions rising to the level of the Federal Circuit 
typically address issues with a broader impact on importers than 
whether a product fits under one subheading or another of the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”).7  As 
shown in the cases described below, 2006 was no exception in this 
regard. 
Motorola, Inc. v. United States8 involved the tariff classification of 
eight models of circuits used in battery packs for cellular phones.9  In 
this case, Motorola, Inc. (“Motorola”) argued that all eight of its 
circuits should be classified under HTSUS subheading 8542.40.00 for 
“hybrid integrated circuits,” which enter duty-free.10  Customs had 
classified the circuits under subheading 8536.30.80, which carries a 
duty rate of 3.2% ad valorem.11  The CIT had sustained Customs’ 
classification, relying on the HTSUS Explanatory Notes for 
guidance.12  The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT on this issue, 
                                                          
 6. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, U.S. Customs Service—Over 200 Years of 
History, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/home.xml (follow “about cbp” hyperlink; then 
follow “History” hyperlink; then follow “U.S. Customs Service—Over 200 Years of 
History” hyperlink). 
 7. United States International Trade Commission, Official Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule, http://www.usitc.gov (follow “Official Harmonized Tariff Schedule” 
hyperlink) (describing the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, the source for establishing 
tariff classifications for goods imported into the United States). 
 8. 436 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 9. Id. at 1358. 
 10. Id. at 1358-59. 
 11. See id. at 1359 (stating that the subheading covers “other apparatus for 
protecting electrical circuits”). 
 12. See id. at 1360-61 (noting that the CIT used the Explanatory Notes to the 
HTSUS, an “instructive, but not binding” source, to determine that the Motorola 
circuits did not meet the “combined . . . indivisibly” requirement of “hybrid 
integrated circuits”). 
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finding that Motorola had not met its burden in challenging the tariff 
classification, and noting that “[b]ecause the court used the 
Explanatory Note for guidance as to the meaning of a definitional 
term and did not treat the Explanatory Note as setting forth an 
additional definitional requirement, we conclude that the trial court 
did not commit legal error by referring to the Explanatory Note.”13 
In a second issue in this case, the Federal Circuit confronted 
whether some or all of Motorola’s circuits should be entered duty-
free on the grounds that Customs had previously granted the same or 
similar circuits duty-free treatment and failed to publish its contrary 
ruling for notice and comment.14  Here, giving Chevron15 deference to 
Customs’ interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c),16 despite the fact that 
Customs’ interpretation in 19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c)(1)(ii) postdated the 
events to which the interpretation was applied,17 the Federal Circuit 
ruled that Customs’ expedited “bypass” procedures, in which goods 
are admitted pursuant to representations by the importer and are not 
independently examined or reviewed, do not constitute “treatment” 
of the goods.18  Therefore, the Federal Circuit remanded to the CIT 
to address whether the particular entries in this case were processed 
without review or examination by Customs.19 
In Brother International Corp. v. United States,20 the Federal Circuit 
addressed whether Brother International Corp.’s (“Brother’s”) 
misclassification of multifunction centers (“MFCs”), which are office 
equipment with multiple functions, such as printing, copying, faxing, 
and scanning, was due to a mistake of fact or a mistake of law.21  19 
U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1) allows the reliquidation of goods previously 
misclassified based on a mistake of fact (but not if the mistake also 
involved a mistake of law).22  In this case, Brother entered the MFCs 
                                                          
 13. Id. at 1361. 
 14. Id. at 1362. 
 15. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984) (requiring courts to defer to statutory interpretations made by 
administrative agencies as long as the interpretations are reasonable). 
 16. See Motorola, 436 F.3d at 1363-64  (pointing out that 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) 
(2000) provides that a proposed Customs interpretive ruling or decision that would 
modify or revoke a prior interpretive ruling or decision must first be published in the 
Customs Bulletin to allow for comment by interested parties). 
 17. See id. at 1366 (finding that Chevron deference is appropriate in such 
situations as long as the agency’s interpretation is supported by other regulations or 
administrative rulings and is not intended to protect past agency action from attack). 
 18. Id. at 1366-67. 
 19. Id. at 1368. 
 20. 464 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 21. Id. at 1320-22. 
 22. See id. at 1321 (pointing out that despite the repeal of 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c) on 
December 3, 2004, the case involves events from 1997, resulting in current 
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in 1996 and 1997 with Brother’s customs broker mistakenly 
classifying the MFCs under the category for photocopying apparatus 
with a 3.7% duty.23  Later in 1997, Brother requested a tariff 
classification for the same type of machine and Customs concluded 
that the correct heading was the heading for other laser printer units, 
a duty free provision.24  Relying on 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c)(1), Brother 
requested reliquidation of the earlier entries of MFCs.25  Customs 
refused and the CIT affirmed, finding that the original 
misclassification was due to a combination of a mistake of fact and of 
law and therefore ineligible for reliquidation under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1520(c)(1).26  The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the only 
mistake was the factual error on the part of the customs broker who 
did not know that the essential character of the MFCs was the printer 
and that “a mistake of fact that leads to a misclassification is still a 
mistake of fact.”27  As a result, the Federal Circuit reversed and 
remanded the case to the CIT to further remand to Customs so that 
Customs could reliquidate the goods and refund the excess duties to 
Brother.28 
Cummins Inc. v. United States29 dealt with whether certain crankshafts 
classified under HTSUS subheading 8483.1030 undergo a tariff shift 
in Mexico (after importation to Mexico from Brazil and before 
importation into the United States), thus entitling them to 
preferential treatment under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”) as goods originating in Mexico.30  In this 
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s holding that the 
crankshafts were not entitled to preferential treatment under NAFTA 
as they were not Mexican in origin.31 
Under General Notes 12(b)(i)-(iv), 12(b)(ii)(A), 12(t)/84.243(A), 
HTSUS, products may be considered to “originate in the territory of 
a NAFTA party” if they are “transformed in the territory” of a NAFTA 
                                                                                                                                      
application of the repealed statute); see also Pub. L. No. 108-429, § 2105, 118 Stat. 
2598 (2004) (repealing § 1520(c)). 
 23. See Brother Int’l, 464 U.S. at 1322-23 (observing that the customs broker could 
not determine the MFC’s principal function and thus mistakenly classified the 
machines). 
 24. See id. (finding that despite its multifunction capabilities “the printing 
function . . . dictates the principal function of [the] machine”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. at 1322-23 (concluding that Brother’s customs broker’s decision to 
classify the MFCs under a particular provision of HTSUS and further reliance on a 
Customs ruling constituted determinations of law). 
 27. Id. at 1324. 
 28. Id. 
 29. 454 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 30. Id. at 1361-62. 
 31. Id. at 1363, 1366. 
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party, including a transformation by undergoing a “change in tariff 
classification.”32  Cummins argued before Customs, the CIT, and the 
Federal Circuit that the crankshafts it imports into the United States 
undergo a tariff shift in Mexico, and thereby are entitled to 
preferential duty treatment under NAFTA.33  Cummins contended 
that the proper classification of its crankshafts upon import into 
Mexico was heading 7224 as “semifinished products of other alloy 
steel,” which have not been further worked beyond being roughly 
shaped by forging.34  While the parties disputed the meaning of the 
term “further worked,”35 the Federal Circuit looked to its common 
and commercial meanings, which it found to be “to form, fashion, or 
shape an existing product to a greater extent.”36  Under this 
definition, the Federal Circuit found that the crankshafts were 
“further worked” before importation into Mexico37 and that, 
moreover, under HTSUS General Rule of Interpretation 2(a) (which 
classifies an incomplete or unfinished product as the finished article 
if it has the “essential character” of the finished article) the product 
“imported into Mexico had the general shape of a crankshaft and was 
intended for use only in producing a finished crankshaft,” resulting 
in a proper classification of the product under subheading 
8483.10.30 upon importation into Mexico.38 
In affirming the CIT’s summary judgment ruling against Cummins, 
the Federal Circuit also found that the CIT did not improperly rely 
on an opinion of the World Customs Organization (“WCO”) because 
the CIT had accorded no deference to the WCO opinion and instead 
made its own independent assessment, relying on the WCO opinion 
only as persuasive authority.39 
In Processed Plastics Co. v. United States,40 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the CIT’s decision granting summary judgment for the United States 
and holding that Customs properly classified two children’s 
backpacks and one children’s beach bag under HTSUS subheading 
                                                          
 32. Id. at 1361-62. 
 33. Id. at 1362-63. 
 34. See id. at 1363-64 (noting that classification under heading 7224 means the 
product underwent a tariff shift and is entitled to preferential NAFTA treatment). 
 35. See id. (stating that if the product had been “further worked” prior to 
importation into Mexico, then it could not be classified within heading 7224). 
 36. Id. at 1365. 
 37. See id. (determining that the product was forged, trimmed, coined, shot 
blasted, milled, and mass centered in Brazil, satisfying the “further worked” 
definition). 
 38. Id. at 1365-66. 
 39. See id. at 1366 (pointing out that U.S. courts do not give deference to WCO 
opinions, but may rely on them as persuasive authority). 
 40. 473 F.3d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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4202.92.45 (for traveling bags, knapsacks, and backpacks) instead of 
subheading 9503.70.00 (for certain toys).41 
The two backpacks were made of polyvinyl chloride plastic sheeting 
with plastic mesh on the bottom, contained imprints of “Pooh” and 
“Barbie” characters, and were approximately eleven inches high, nine 
inches wide, and three and a half inches deep.42  The beach bag was a 
vertical cylinder twelve inches high and nine inches in diameter 
made generally of the same materials as the backpacks.43  Processed 
Plastics Co. (“Processed”) sold the backpacks and bag with an 
assortment of sand toys inside each bag.44 
Processed argued in its appeal, and the Federal Circuit agreed, that 
the court should use the standard adopted in Minnetonka Brands, Inc. 
v. United States45 to determine whether Processed’s merchandise 
should be classified as a toy, as the HTSUS does not define the word 
“toy.”46  In that case, the CIT determined that the principal use of a 
“toy” is amusement, diversion, or play rather than practicality.47  
However, in applying this standard, the Federal Circuit disagreed 
with Processed that the seven factors cited in Minnetonka were 
definitive in defining a toy, finding instead that the factors were 
“simply areas of inquiry that may prove useful in determining what is 
the principal use of merchandise alleged to be a ‘toy.’”48  The Federal 
Circuit then agreed with the CIT’s finding that Processed failed to 
allege facts sufficient to conclude that the primary use of Processed’s 
merchandise was for play and, therefore, a toy.49  The Federal Circuit 
also agreed with the CIT that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact preventing a determination that the merchandise was 
properly classified as a backpack under subheading 4202.92.45, since 
Processed’s only argument against this classification was that the bags 
were limited in how much weight they could carry and heading 4202 
contains no weight or structural integrity requirement.50  The Federal 
                                                          
 41. Id. at 1167. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1167-68. 
 44. Id. at 1168. 
 45. 110 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000).  In Minnetoka, the Court of 
International Trade held that imported products consisting of hollow plastic bodies 
and heads in the shape of cartoon characters used to sell bubble bath were 
classifiable as toys, not as plastic bottles and lids for conveyance of goods.  The Court 
listed seven factors for determining whether an import is of “class or kind” covered 
by a particular tariff.  Id.  
 46. Processed, 473 F.3d at 1169. 
 47. See id. (noting the Federal Circuit’s agreement with the specific Minnetonka 
“toy” standard). 
 48. Id. at 1170. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1171. 
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Circuit rejected additional related arguments under General Rules of 
Interpretation 1 and 3 of the HTSUS, finding that the items were 
properly classified under 4202.92.45.51 
In Fujitsu Compound Semiconductor, Inc. v. United States,52 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision affirming Customs’ denial of 
Fujitsu Compound Semiconductor, Inc.’s (“Fujitsu’s”) request for 
reliquidation of certain imports of laser diode modules.53  Fujitsu 
imported laser diode modules, which were classified under HTSUS 
subheading 8541.40.95 with a duty rate of 4.2%, in 1991 and 1992.54  
In June 1992, in response to a protest by another importer, Customs 
changed the classification of laser diode modules to HTSUS 
subheading 8541.40.20 with a duty rate of two percent and applied 
this new classification to unliquidated Fujitsu entries.55  This appeal 
involved Fujitsu entries which were liquidated within ninety days 
before Customs’ ruling changing the liquidation of the entries.56 
Fujitsu filed a “Mistake of Fact” petition under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1520(c)(1), arguing that Customs was required to reliquidate its 
entries because the entries were not final when the Customs’ ruling 
was issued, but were within the ninety-day protest period.57  Here, the 
Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that Customs was not required to 
reliquidate the entries at its own initiative.58  Instead, the court found 
that the burden is on the importer to file a timely protest in order to 
obtain the benefit of any post-liquidation rulings during the ninety-
day protest period.59 
B. Jurisdictional Issues 
In two recent cases, the Federal Circuit addressed whether Customs 
made a protestable decision conferring jurisdiction on the CIT under 
28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)60 where Customs liquidated certain merchandise 
that might have been entitled to duty-free treatment under NAFTA, 
                                                          
 51. See id. at 1172-73 (denying Processed’s argument that the “rule of relative 
specificity” in General Rule of Interpretation 3(a) leads to classification as a toy). 
 52. 363 F.3d 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 53. Id. at 1231. 
 54. Id. at 1232. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. (highlighting Fujitsu’s argument that “Customs committed a mistake of 
fact by failing sua sponte to reclassify and reliquidate these entries in light of the 
[other ruling]”). 
 58. Id. at 1235. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (2000) (granting the CIT exclusive jurisdiction over 
civil actions challenging denial of a protest under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 
1930). 
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but the importer did not make a proper NAFTA claim prior to 
liquidation.  In both cases, the Federal Circuit determined that an 
importer must satisfy the statutory requirements for NAFTA eligibility 
in order for Customs to have made a “protestable decision” subject to 
review by the CIT.  In Corrpro Companies, Inc. v. United States,61 an 
importer sought preferential treatment under NAFTA for certain 
entries of merchandise.62  The importer did not make a written 
declaration and submit certifications regarding NAFTA treatment, as 
required under the NAFTA implementing regulation63 to be done 
within one year of importation.64  Nevertheless, the importer filed a 
protest to Customs’ liquidation of its merchandise under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1514(a), a procedural mechanism regarding protests of Customs 
decisions pertaining to classification, rate, and amount of duties, and 
claimed duty-free treatment under NAFTA.65  While the CIT had 
found jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit disagreed, citing the lack of a 
“protestable decision” by Customs.66  In particular, the Federal Circuit 
held that 
[t]here is a protestable decision as to NAFTA eligibility that confers 
jurisdiction in the Court of International Trade under 28 U.S.C. § 
1581(a) only when the importer has made a valid claim for NAFTA 
treatment, either at entry or within a year of entry, with a written 
declaration and Certificates of Origin presented in a timely 
fashion, and Customs has engaged in ‘some sort of decision-
making process’ expressly considering the merits of that claim.67 
Similarly, in a 2005 decision, Xerox v. United States,68 the Federal 
Circuit held that Customs’ liquidation of an importer’s entries was 
not a protestable decision with respect to preferential treatment 
under NAFTA where Customs did not consider the merits of NAFTA 
                                                          
 61. 433 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 62. Id. at 1362. 
 63. See 19 C.F.R. § 181.11(a) (2005) (stating that “[a] Certificate of Origin shall 
be employed to certify that a good being exported either from the United States into 
Canada or Mexico or from Canada or Mexico into the United States qualifies as an 
originating good for purposes of preferential tariff treatment under the NAFTA”); 19 
C.F.R. § 181.21(a) (2005) (stating that the U.S. importer must make a written 
declaration that a good qualifies for treatment under the NAFTA). 
 64. See 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d) (2000) (stating that even if the importer does not 
make a NAFTA claim at time of entry, Customs may still grant preferential treatment 
under NAFTA if the importer files a written declaration and copies of applicable 
Certificates of Origin within one year of importation). 
 65. See Corrpro, 433 F.3d at 1363 (noting that 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) does not 
address NAFTA eligibility). 
 66. Id. at 1365. 
 67. Id. (quoting U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 114 F.3d 1564, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)). 
 68. 423 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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eligibility because the importer did not make a proper claim for 
NAFTA treatment.69 
In another Customs appeal involving jurisdictional issues, 
DaimlerChrysler Corporation v. United States,70 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the CIT’s decision denying DaimlerChrysler Corporation’s 
(“Daimler’s”) motion to amend its summons to identify seven 
additional protests of Customs’ decisions71 that Daimler failed to 
identify in its original summons.72  The Federal Circuit agreed with 
the CIT that it did not have jurisdiction to review the seven omitted 
protests because Daimler did not file its motion to amend within the 
180 day limitation period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2636(a).73  In this 
case, Daimler appealed a large number of protests with the CIT and 
filed an attached schedule of protests with its summons, omitting 
seven protests covering more than four hundred entries and ninety-
seven entries from a protest specifically identified in the summons.74  
When Daimler moved to amend its summons more than 180 days 
after receiving notice from Customs of its denial of Daimler’s 
protests, the CIT held that, while Daimler could include the ninety-
seven omitted entries because jurisdiction attached to the listed 
protests, Daimler could not add the seven omitted protests because 
the CIT was without jurisdiction.75  The Federal Circuit agreed, 
finding that jurisdiction turned on the sufficiency of the summons as 
to the omitted protests because the summons must establish the 
CIT’s jurisdiction in a protest appeal and each protest forms the basis 
for a separate cause of action.76  The Federal Circuit held that each 
protest involved in the suit must be specifically identified in order for 
jurisdiction to attach to those protests, and where, as here, the 
protests were not specifically identified, the CIT lacked jurisdiction 
over those protests.77  The Federal Circuit also noted that typical res 
judicata rules do not apply in protest cases, meaning that protests 
may intentionally be omitted from a summons in order to preserve 
the opportunity to relitigate issues regarding the classification of 
merchandise in a later suit.78  As a result, there is no fair notice 
                                                          
 69. Id. at 1357-58. 
 70. 442 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 71. Id. at 1314 (noting that “[u]nder section 515 of the Tariff Act, an importer 
may challenge Customs’ liquidation of imports including classification of 
merchandise under the HTSUS, by filing a ‘protest’ with Customs”). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1322-23. 
 74. Id. at 1316. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1317-18. 
 77. Id. at 1319. 
 78. Id. at 1321. 
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regarding a protest appeal unless it is specifically identified in the 
summons during the 180-day appeal window.79 
In Forest Products Northwest, Inc. v. United States,80 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the holding of the Court of Federal Claims (“CFC”) that the 
CFC did not have jurisdiction over Forest Products Northwest, Inc.’s 
(“Forest Products’”) claim for a refund of antidumping and 
countervailing duties paid to Customs.81  Forest Products had 
imported two shipments of lumber from Canada in October 2003 
and, as both entries were allegedly subject to antidumping and 
countervailing duties, had paid estimated duties at the time of 
importation.82  Forest Products then sued the United States in the 
CFC, arguing that Customs misclassified the subject imports, that 
Customs violated the Customs Modernization Act83 by failing to 
adhere to another Customs ruling, and that Customs should not have 
applied the antidumping and countervailing duty orders to Forest 
Products’ imports.84  The government filed a motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction, which the CFC granted.85  Forest Products 
appealed this dismissal to the Federal Circuit.86 
In affirming the decision of the CFC, the Federal Circuit noted that 
the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(c), specifically excludes from the 
CFC’s jurisdiction any civil action within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the CIT.87  In addition, in order for Forest Products to sue in the CFC, 
it must assert an independent contractual relationship, constitutional 
provision, federal statute, or executive agency regulation that 
provides a substantive right to money damages.88  Since a substantive 
right to money damages in cases involving antidumping or 
countervailing duty orders (such as might be initially addressed in a 
Commerce administrative review determination or Commerce scope 
ruling) or Customs’ liquidation of entries (such as might be 
addressed in a protest to Customs) are under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the CIT, as are any other federal statutes or 
                                                          
 79. Id. at 1321-22. 
 80. 453 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 81. Id. at 1356-57. 
 82. See id. at 1357 (noting that Forest Products paid the duties “under protest”). 
 83. 19 U.S.C. § 1625 (2000). 
 84. Forest Prods., 453 F.3d at 1357. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1359.  However, the CFC has jurisdiction over “any claim against the 
United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any act of Congress or any 
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with 
the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding 
in tort.”  28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000). 
 88. Forest Prods., 453 F.3d at 1359. 
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constitutional provisions relating to a substantive right to monetary 
damages over duties upon importation, Forest Products’ claims are 
not within the jurisdiction of the CFC.89 
In yet another jurisdictional decision, International Custom Products, 
Inc. v. United States,90 the Federal Circuit concluded that the CIT 
lacked jurisdiction over International Custom Products, Inc.’s 
(“ICP’s”) complaint regarding Customs’ classification decision for 
ICP’s imports of white sauce.91  Prior to beginning importation of its 
white sauce, ICP received a letter ruling from Customs classifying the 
sauce under one heading in January 1999, but, based on a tariff rate 
investigation in 2004, Customs classified unliquidated ICP entries 
under a different tariff heading in 2005, resulting in a substantially 
increased tariff rate.92  Customs then liquidated the entries under that 
heading.  ICP did not file a protest of the liquidation with Customs, 
but instead appealed to the CIT, arguing that Customs’ actions 
violated 19 U.S.C. § 1925(c)(1) or (2) by effectively revoking the 1999 
letter ruling without proper procedures.93  The CIT found that it had 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4).94 
The Federal Circuit disagreed.  The court found that the proper 
review of Customs’ actions is through a protest, with review of protest 
denials available by the CIT under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) jurisdiction 
unless such jurisdiction would be “manifestly inadequate,” in which 
case residual jurisdiction is available under § 1581(i).95  ICP alleged:  
(1) financial hardship; (2) a lack of prospective relief; (3) delays in 
proceeding under § 1581(a); and (4) futility of a protest.96  However, 
the Federal Circuit found that following the protest procedures 
would not have been manifestly inadequate because:  (1) financial 
hardship does not make Congress’s remedy inadequate; (2) the court 
would not assume that Customs would disregard a court ruling on 
current imports when classifying in the future; (3) “delays inherent in 
the statutory process do not render it manifestly inadequate;” and 
(4) it is not for the plaintiff to determine whether it would be futile to 
protest or not.97  Therefore, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to 
                                                          
 89. Id. at 1359-60. 
 90. 467 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1326. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1326-27 (quoting Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 824 F.2d 
356, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 96. Id. at 1327-28. 
 97. Id. 
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the CIT with instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
jurisdiction.98 
In Retamal v. United States Customs and Border Protection,99 the Federal 
Circuit concluded that the CIT did not have jurisdiction over a suit 
involving Customs’ revocation of a customhouse broker’s license after 
the broker failed to file his triennial status report in a timely 
manner.100  The broker contended that the CIT had jurisdiction 
under the CIT’s residual jurisdictional provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), 
but the Federal Circuit found that, because the broker’s claims did 
not relate to the “administration and enforcement” of a matter 
referred to in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)-(h) or in § 1581(i)(1)-(3), 
§ 1581(i)(4) could not provide an independent ground for 
jurisdiction.101 
C. Deemed Liquidation 
Two 2005 Federal Circuit opinions addressed the issue of “deemed 
liquidation” under 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d).  The first, NEC Solutions 
(America), Inc. v. United States,102 addressed the issue of the timing of 
“deemed liquidation.”  In this case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
CIT’s conclusions that the period for “deemed liquidation” was 
triggered when Customs received an e-mail liquidation notice from 
Commerce, and that service on the United States Department of 
Justice did not constitute “notice” to Customs.103 
19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) requires Customs to liquidate entries within six 
months of receiving notice that suspension of liquidation of the 
entries has been removed.104  If Customs does not liquidate the 
entries within this six month period, the entries are deemed 
liquidated at the rate asserted upon entry.105  In this case, the parties 
disputed whether an e-mail message sent to Customs regarding 
entries of NEC Solutions (America), Inc. (“NEC”) of Japanese 
television sets subject to an antidumping duty order was sufficient 
“notice” to trigger deemed liquidation after six months.106  The court 
found that the e-mail notice was sufficient because it was 
                                                          
 98. Id. at 1328. 
 99. 439 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 1375. 
 102. 411 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 103. Id. at 1347. 
 104. Id. at 1344 (observing also that the notice must be sufficiently unambiguous 
of the fact that the suspension of liquidation has been lifted, but it need not include 
specific liquidation instructions). 
 105. Id. (citing Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002)). 
 106. Id. 
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unambiguous, despite lacking specific language about the removal of 
the suspension of liquidation.107  The Federal Circuit held that 
[n]either the statute nor our precedent requires that the notice 
give explicit instructions to liquidate or use particular language in 
order to provide notice that the removal of suspension has 
occurred . . . . [and] neither the statute nor our precedent requires 
that the duty rate be included in the notice in order to satisfy the 
requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d).108 
The Federal Circuit also found that “Commerce’s intent and the 
bureaucratic difficulty of conveying Commerce’s intent are 
irrelevant.”109  Finally, in response to an NEC argument that Customs 
received constructive notice of the lifting of suspension of liquidation 
for later reviews, the Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT and held 
“that service of an opinion to attorneys at [the] Justice [Department] 
does not constitute constructive notice to Customs.”110 
International Trading Co. v. United States111 also dealt with the issue of 
deemed liquidation pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d).  In this case, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s determination that the period for 
deemed liquidation of entries subject to an administrative review of 
an antidumping duty order is first triggered when Commerce 
publishes its final results of administrative review in the Federal 
Register, even if Commerce later issues explicit liquidation 
instructions to Customs.112 Because Customs failed to liquidate 
International Trading Company’s entries of shop towels until more 
than six months after Commerce published the final results of its 
administrative review, in which it calculated antidumping duties on 
this type of towel at 27.31%, the entries were deemed liquidated at 
the cash deposit rate at the time of entry, or 2.72%.113 
D. Byrd Amendment 
Candle Corp. of America v. United States International Trade 
Commission114 presented the issue of whether a company that opposed 
an antidumping investigation was entitled to receive offset 
                                                          
 107. Id. at 1345 (citing several phrases from the e-mail and announcing “[w]e read 
these provisions of the e-mail and the e-mail as a whole as giving notice to Customs 
that there was nothing preventing the entries of NEC from being liquidated, and 
thus, that the suspension of liquidation had been removed”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1346. 
 110. Id. at 1347. 
 111. 412 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 112. Id. at 1313. 
 113. Id. at 1305-06, 1313. 
 114. 374 F.3d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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distributions under the Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act, 
19 U.S.C. § 1675c (“Byrd Amendment”) by acquiring U.S. businesses 
that would have been entitled to Byrd Amendment distributions.115  
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT in finding that such companies 
were not entitled to the distributions.116 
Under the Byrd Amendment, “affected domestic producers” may 
receive distributions of antidumping duties imposed on foreign 
producers.117  “Affected domestic producers” must either be 
petitioners or interested parties who supported the petition.118  The 
statute also provides that “[c]ompanies, businesses, or persons that 
have ceased the production of the product covered by the order or 
finding or who have been acquired by a company or business that is 
related to a company that opposed the investigation shall not be an 
affected domestic producer.”119 
In this case, Candle Corporation of America (“CCA”) did not 
support the antidumping duty petition against petroleum wax 
candles from the People’s Republic of China because it imported 
candles subject to the investigation.120  However, CCA later acquired 
substantially all of the assets of two companies that had supported the 
petition and sought to receive Byrd Amendment distributions on 
their behalf, which Customs refused.121 
Finding the statutory language ambiguous,122 the Federal Circuit 
looked to the purpose of the relevant section of the Byrd 
Amendment:  “to bar opposers of antidumping investigations from 
securing payments either directly or through the acquisition of 
supporting parties” to determine that CCA was not entitled to receive 
Byrd Amendment funds.123  The Federal Circuit held that the Byrd 
Amendment barred “claims on behalf of otherwise affected domestic 
producers if those producers were acquired by a company that 
opposed the investigation or were acquired by a business related to a 
company that opposed the investigation.”124  The Federal Circuit also 
found that “[t]his barrier exists whether the claim is made by the 
                                                          
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1094. 
 117. 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(a) (2000). 
 118. Id. § 1675c(b)(1). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Candle Corp. of Am., 374 F.3d at 1089. 
 121. Id. at 1090. 
 122. Id. at 1092-93. 
 123. Id. at 1094. 
 124. Id. 
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acquiring company on behalf of the acquired entities or by the 
acquired entities themselves.”125 
In another Byrd Amendment case, Dixon Ticonderoga Co. v. United 
States,126 the Federal Circuit reversed the CIT’s judgment granting 
Dixon Ticonderoga Company’s (“Dixon’s”) motion for judgment on 
the administrative record.127  The Federal Circuit found that the 
record contained no evidence that Dixon was substantially prejudiced 
by Customs’ failure to publish a timely notice of intention to 
distribute duties under the Byrd Amendment as required by 19 C.F.R. 
§ 159.62(a).128 
Under the Byrd Amendment and related regulations, Customs is 
required to publish a Notice of Intent to Distribute duties (“Notice”) 
at least thirty days before the distribution of a continued dumping 
and subsidy offset, to publish the Notice at least ninety days before 
the end of the fiscal year, and to make distributions within sixty days 
after the fiscal year.129  Parties seeking a share of the distribution have 
sixty days from the date of the Notice to file the required 
certifications to receive a distribution.130  In this case, Customs 
published its 2003 Notice seventy-eight days prior to the end of the 
fiscal year and twelve days after the regulatory deadline, while Dixon 
filed its certifications 102 days after Customs published the Notice.131  
Customs then denied Dixon’s application to receive a Byrd 
Amendment distribution.132  On appeal, although the CIT 
determined that the regulatory timing requirements were merely 
procedural aids, the CIT nevertheless held that Dixon was prejudiced 
by Customs’ failure to meet its regulatory timing requirements and 
entered judgment for Dixon.133 
The Federal Circuit reversed because Dixon had provided no 
evidence that it requested an extension or that its failure to file a 
timely application was caused by Customs’ late publication of the 
notice.134  The court found that the CIT’s decision had effectively 
eliminated the prejudice requirement when an agency misses a 
statutory or regulatory deadline.135 
                                                          
 125. Id. 
 126. 468 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 1354. 
 129. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c(c), (d)(2); 19 C.F.R. § 159.62(a) (2003).   
 130. 19 C.F.R. § 159.63(a) (2003).   
 131. Dixon Ticonderoga Co., 468 F.3d at 1354-55. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1355. 
 134. Id. at 1356 (analogizing to PAM, S.p.A. v. United States, 463 F.3d 1345 (Fed. 
Cir. 2006)). 
 135. Id. at 1357. 
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E. Other Customs Issues 
In Saab Cars USA, Inc. v. United States,136 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the CIT’s decision affirming, in part, Customs’ decisions denying 
Saab Cars USA, Inc.’s (“Saab’s”) protest of decisions denying duty 
allowances for defective imported automobiles.137  Saab had filed a 
protest with Customs pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 158.12 seeking an 
allowance against import duties for the value of certain automobiles 
imported from Saab’s Swedish parent company where the 
automobiles allegedly contained “latent defects” discovered after 
importation.138  Under 19 C.F.R. § 158.12, importers may receive such 
an allowance for “[m]erchandise . . .  found by the port director to be 
partially damaged at the time of importation.”139  The Federal Circuit 
found that the words “at the time of importation” modify the phrase 
“partially damaged” and not the verb “found.”140  Therefore, the 
Federal Circuit held that “the regulation permits allowances for 
merchandise that the port director finds, at any time, to have been 
partially damaged at the time of importation.”141 
Nevertheless, the lower court had rejected virtually all of Saab’s 
claims pursuant to an earlier series of cases that set forth three 
requirements for an importer to claim an allowance under 19 C.F.R. 
§ 158.12:  (1) show that the importer contracted for “defect-free” 
merchandise; (2) link the defective merchandise to specific entries; 
and (3) prove the amount of the allowance for each entry.142  The 
Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision,143 finding that Saab had 
provided insufficient evidence to demonstrate its entitlement to 
allowances for over-appraisals of damaged merchandise for some 
portions of its claims.144  In particular, the Federal Circuit agreed with 
the CIT that Saab’s information about its port repair claims (close in 
                                                          
 136. 434 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 137. Id. at 1361. 
 138. Id. at 1362. 
 139. 19 C.F.R. § 158.12(a) (2005). 
 140. Saab, 434 F.3d at 1369. 
 141. Id. at 1369-70. 
 142. See Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 195 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999); 
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 106 F.3d 376 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Samsung 
Elecs. Am., Inc. v. United States, 35 F. Supp. 2d 942 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999). 
 143. The issue of the correct standard of review for judgment issued on stipulated 
facts in lieu of trial, as occurred in this case, was an issue of first impression for this 
court.  The Federal Circuit determined that a judgment issued on stipulated facts in 
lieu of trial resembles a decision on the administrative record and is determinatively 
different than summary judgment for standard of review purposes.  The Federal 
Circuit held that it reviews the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo and reviews 
inferences the lower court drew from the stipulated facts, and its application of the 
law to those facts, for clear error.  Saab, 434 F.3d at 1372. 
 144. Id. at 1372-74. 
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time to importation) was sufficient to establish that the automobile 
defects were present at the time of importation,145 while the evidence 
about warranty repairs did not necessarily indicate damage that 
existed at the time of importation, and therefore did not, with limited 
exceptions, meet the requirements for an allowance under 19 C.F.R. 
§ 158.12.146 
United States v. Ford Motor Co. (“Ford I”)147 was the first of two cases 
decided by the Federal Circuit in 2006 regarding Ford Motor 
Company’s (“Ford’s”) alleged misrepresentations of import entries.  
In this case, in which the CIT imposed a fine of over $17,000,000, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for 
further proceedings.148 
The CIT held that Ford knowingly violated affirmative 
requirements by omitting information required by 19 U.S.C. § 1484 
for Customs to assess proper duties on imports.149  In particular, the 
CIT held that Ford had failed to provide information about 
“assists”—design or engineering work done overseas, not factored 
into the invoice price, but still subject to import duties and “lump-
sum payments”—payments by the importer to the seller that are in 
addition to the original price and are subject to import duties.150 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that 19 U.S.C. § 1484 does 
require that importers disclose variable pricing agreements relating 
to entries because a non-final declared value is not one upon which 
Customs can assess the correct duty.151  However, the Federal Circuit 
also held that Ford should not be penalized for violating this 
requirement because the duty to disclose was not widely known and 
Customs’ practice requiring disclosure was unclear when Ford made 
its import entries.152 
At the same time, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s holding 
that Ford had made assists between 1987 and 1992 and that Ford 
negligently failed to declare the assists on its entry documents or “at 
once” thereafter.153  The Federal Circuit also affirmed that Ford failed 
to comply with the “at once” requirement regarding lump-sum 
                                                          
 145. Id. at 1374. 
 146. Id. at 1375. 
 147. 463 F.3d 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 148. Id. at 1271. 
 149. Id. at 1273. 
 150. Id. at 1271, 1273. 
 151. Id. at 1275. 
 152. Id. at 1275-76 (holding that due process considerations precluded imposing 
penalties on Ford). 
 153. Id. at 1276-77. 
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payments under 19 U.S.C. § 1485.154  The Federal Circuit based its 
holding regarding assists and lump-sum payments in part on Ford’s 
failure to raise certain arguments until late in the proceedings and in 
part on the unambiguous deadline in a Ford-Customs agreement 
regarding lump-sum payments.155 
The Federal Circuit also ruled that 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4), which 
provides a safe harbor for disclosures of import law violations “before, 
or without knowledge of, the commencement of a formal 
investigation,”156 did not provide Ford a safe harbor where Ford was 
presumed to know about the scope of a Customs investigation of Ford 
following a meeting with Customs.157  The court found that Ford 
presented no evidence sufficient to rebut that presumption.158 
In addition, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT erred when it 
included, in the calculation of penalties, entries relating to any model 
year after 1991 as such entries were not included in the scope of 
Customs’ investigation.159  Also on the subject of penalties, the 
Federal Circuit remanded the issue of multi-year tenders to 
determine which portion of the tenders related to the model years 
under investigation.160 
The Federal Circuit addressed the dutiability of Ford’s purchase 
payments for certain automobiles for import where the price for each 
vehicle depended on the number of vehicles.161  The Federal Circuit 
ultimately held that payments made pursuant to this “shortfall” 
provision were dutiable, basing its holding on its finding that the 
“shortfall” payments were part of the price “actually paid or payable” 
for the vehicles under 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(b)(1).162 
Finally, the Federal Circuit determined that the CIT had not 
abused its discretion when it imposed the maximum penalty 
permitted by the statute, subject to the Federal Circuit’s adjustments 
discussed above.163 
In a companion Ford case decided on the same day as Ford I, United 
States v. Ford Motor Co. (“Ford II”),164 the Federal Circuit affirmed in 
part and reversed in part the CIT’s finding that Ford was liable for 
                                                          
 154. Id. at 1277. 
 155. Id. at 1276-77. 
 156. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4) (2000). 
 157. Ford I, 463 F.3d at 1281. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1282-83. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 1283. 
 162. Id. at 1284. 
 163. Id. at 1285-86.  See supra notes 159-160 and accompanying text. 
 164. 463 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
BAJ.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:13:26 AM 
1042 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Vol. 56:4 
$3,000,000 (plus interest) for Ford’s “grossly negligent 
misrepresentation” of the value of certain import entries.165  This case 
involved duties paid on certain items for the 1990 Lincoln Town car, 
where the initial purchase order was modified over several years due 
to design changes.166 
As in Ford I, the Federal Circuit held that due process precluded 
the imposition of liability for Ford’s failure to disclose its provisional 
pricing arrangement as neither 19 U.S.C. § 1484 nor the applicable 
regulations clearly required such disclosure.167  Nevertheless, the 
Federal Circuit in Ford II held that Ford’s certification at the time of 
entry that the values were “true and correct” was a violation of 19 
U.S.C. § 1484 because Ford had sufficient information about the true 
value of the declared entries as of the date of entry.168  As a result, the 
court affirmed the CIT’s finding that Ford’s violation was one of gross 
negligence.169 
The Federal Circuit also held, as had the CIT, that Ford violated 19 
U.S.C. § 1485 because Ford failed to answer Customs’ forms fully and 
failed to promptly disclose information about design changes and 
their effect on dutiable value.170  The Federal Circuit also affirmed the 
CIT’s holding that Ford’s violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1485 was grossly 
negligent.171 
As in Ford I, the Federal Circuit ruled that Ford did not qualify 
under the 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4) safe harbor provision because the 
CIT’s determination that Ford had knowledge of Customs’ 
investigation prior to any disclosures was not clearly erroneous.172 
Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s denial of Ford’s 
motion to amend its answer to add a counterclaim for overpayments 
made on its entries.173  The Federal Circuit agreed with the CIT that 
the motion was futile since de novo review under 19 U.S.C. § 1592(e) 
does not allow consideration of issues unrelated to the investigation 
that identified the violation in a penalty proceeding.174 
In Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States,175 the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
CIT’s decision ordering Customs to release for entry certain Jazz 
                                                          
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 1289. 
 167. Id. at 1291. 
 168. Id. at 1292. 
 169. Id. at 1293. 
 170. Id. at 1293-94. 
 171. Id. at 1294. 
 172. Id. at 1296. 
 173. Id. at 1296-98. 
 174. Id. 
 175. 439 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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Photo Corporation (“Jazz”) disposable cameras from two shipments 
denied entry by Customs and ordering Customs to allow Jazz to 
segregate the two shipments under Customs’ supervision.176  This was 
the fourth case to reach the Federal Circuit involving Jazz’s 
importation of the disposable cameras.177  Earlier cases involved 
complaints of patent infringement and resulted in a decision by the 
Federal Circuit that there was no infringement of Fuji Photo Film 
Co., Ltd.’s (“Fuji’s”) patent for the importation of cameras where the 
patent right was exhausted by first sale in the United States, and 
where the cameras were permissibly repaired using eight steps 
described in the earlier opinion.178  Infringement of Fuji’s patents was 
found for the importation of other disposable cameras and those 
cameras were excluded from importation into the United States.179 
This appeal involved Customs’ decision to exclude two Jazz 
shipments of disposable cameras that had been initially 
manufactured by Fuji or one of its licensees and were refurbished 
before importation into the United States in 2004.180 Upon appeal, 
the CIT held that Jazz’s cameras processed using shells from one 
collector were first sold in the United States and permissibly repaired 
and should be released by Customs, while shells from another 
collector did not meet the same standard and were properly 
excluded. 181  The CIT based its decision on factual findings regarding 
permissible repair, first sale, and segregation.182 
Upon appeal to the Federal Circuit by the U.S. Government and 
Fuji, the Federal Circuit found that the CIT did not err in holding 
that Jazz satisfied the first sale defense for the subject cameras using 
one collector’s shells.183  Following its holding in Jazz I that the 
                                                          
 176. Id. 
 177. See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(holding Jazz Photo Corp. liable for willful infringement of Fuji patents); Fuji Photo 
Film Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 386 F.3d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (imposing a 
$13,675,000 penalty on Jazz Photo Corp. for violating the Exclusion Order); Jazz 
Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Jazz I), 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(upholding an Exclusion Order against the importation of certain lens fitted film 
packages (“LFFPs”) by the twenty-six respondents who had infringed on fourteen 
patents owned by Fuji, but excluding LFFPs which were first sold in the United 
States). 
 178. Jazz Photo Corp. v. United States (Jazz IV), 439 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(citing Jazz I, 264 F.3d at 1110). 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 1347 (detaining the shipments based on an Exclusion Order against 
Jazz for previous infringement of Fuji patents). 
 181. See id. at 1348 (distinguishing between shipments based on whether the 
LFFPs were first sold in the United States). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See id. at 1352-53 (finding that Jazz proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence that eighty-five percent of its shells used by Photo Recycling, a Jazz 
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“unrestricted sale of a patented article, by or with the authority of the 
patentee, ‘exhausts’ the patentee’s right to control further sale and 
use of that article by enforcing the patent under which it was first 
sold,” the court evaluated evidence that the collector obtained its 
shells in the United States (including circumstantial evidence), and 
concluded that the CIT’s conclusions were not factually or legally 
erroneous.184  The Federal Circuit also held that the subject cameras 
were permissibly repaired under the Jazz I eight step standard 
because the repair steps, including the addition of other minor 
operations, did not make a new single use camera.185 
The Federal Circuit also held that the CIT did not err in ordering 
Customs to supervise Jazz’s segregation of its disposable cameras into 
those allowed entry and those excluded because the cameras were in 
a Customs warehouse and Customs is obligated to supervise certain 
activities in its warehouse pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 19.4(b)(1).186 
Finally, the court held that the CIT did not err in denying Fuji 
intervener status because Fuji was denied the ability to intervene 
under the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j).187 
In Acadia Tech., Inc. v. United States,188 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the CFC’s holding that Acadia Technology Inc. and Global Win 
Technology, Ltd. (collectively, “Acadia”) had failed to state a claim 
on which relief could be granted.189  Acadia attempted to import over 
twenty thousand computer cooling fans into the United States in 
1997 and 1998.190  After receiving a letter from Underwriters 
Laboratories (“UL”) that Acadia’s fans bore UL’s testing trademark 
without authorization, Customs seized the shipments, which were 
ultimately held for four years until a forfeiture action was dismissed.191  
                                                                                                                                      
collector, were purchased in the same location in the United States, and that the trial 
court’s application of “presumption of regularity” was not in error where the 
government provided nothing to contradict the presumption that no infringing 
shells were collected). 
 184. Id. at 1350 (quoting Jazz I, 264 F.3d at 1005). 
 185. Id. at 1353-55 (permitting the refurbishment of patented products if it merely 
involved the replacement of individual unpatented parts, one at a time, and 
emphasizing that the minor violations did not include impermissible full back 
replacements). 
 186. Id. at 1355-56 (emphasizing that 19 C.F.R. § 19.4(b)(1) makes supervision by 
Customs mandatory and that such supervision would not impose “significant 
administrative demands” on Customs). 
 187. Id. at 1357 (holding additionally that Fuji did not have to be joined as a 
necessary party under U.S. CT. INT’L TRADE R. 19 as the government was charged with 
protecting Fuji’s patent rights). 
 188. 458 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. at 1328. 
 191. See id. at 1329 (noting that while Acadia initially filed for dismissal in 1998, 
the U.S. Department of Justice did not promptly file the request). 
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At the time of the dismissal, the fans had become obsolete and were 
valuable only for scrap.192  Acadia therefore filed an action in the CFC 
arguing that the government’s actions violated the Takings Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment193 and that Acadia was entitled to recover the 
lost value of the fans as compensation for the taking.194 
The CFC granted the government’s motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim.195  The Federal Circuit affirmed.  As an initial matter, 
the Federal Circuit noted that, for takings purposes, it must “assume 
that the government conduct at issue was not unlawful.”196  Here, the 
court held that Customs’ “seizure of goods suspected of bearing 
counterfeit marks is a classic example of the government’s exercise of 
the police power to condemn contraband or noxious goods, an 
exercise that has not been regarded as a taking for public use for 
which compensation must be paid.”197  Therefore, while the CFC 
could hear takings cases, Acadia’s allegations did not give rise to a 
takings claim.198  Regarding the government’s delay in returning the 
fans, the Federal Circuit held that this was a potential due process 
violation, but that the CFC lacks jurisdiction over due process claims 
for money damages against the United States.199 
In California Industrial Products, Inc. v. United States,200  the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the CIT’s decision granting California Industrial 
Products, Inc.’s (“CIP’s”) motion for summary judgment, finding that 
Customs erred when it denied CIP manufacturing substitution 
drawbacks for CIP’s exportation of steel scrap under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(b).201  The CIT’s decision was based on Customs’ failure to 
provide notice and comment proceedings required under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1625(c) when its denial of CIP’s claims resulted in a modification of 
                                                          
 192. See id. (tracing the reduction in the value of the fans from $125,130 at the 
time of seizure to $41,000 at the time they were returned). 
 193. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 194. Acadia Tech., Inc., 458 F.3d at 1330 (arguing that the taking was not 
authorized by statute and that the delay in returning the goods was unreasonable, 
therefore a taking). 
 195. Id. at 1330. 
 196. Id. at 1331 (limiting the court’s takings analysis to whether the government’s 
actions were a taking for which compensation would be paid). 
 197. Id. at 1332 (alluding to the general risk owners of property take because of 
the State’s control of commercial activity). 
 198. Id. at 1331-32 (analogizing to property seized in a foreclosure proceeding 
and subsequently restored to the owner, which by rule is not a taking). 
 199. Id. at 1333-34 (contending that an owner of seized property has a due process 
right to have “the government return the property or initiate foreclosure 
proceedings without unreasonable delay”). 
 200. 436 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 201. Id. 
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previously favorable treatment to substantially identical transactions 
by other companies.202 
This appeal arose under 19 U.S.C. § 1313, which provides for a 
partial refund of duties, called a drawback, for manufacturers who 
subsequently export or destroy imported merchandise on which they 
have paid duties.203  Section 1313(b) additionally allows 
manufacturing substitution drawbacks whereby a manufacturer 
receives a drawback upon substituting goods of the same “kind and 
quality” as the goods originally imported.204  In order to simplify this 
process, Customs offers general manufacturing drawback contracts 
through which manufacturers may receive drawbacks after meeting 
the requirements of the contract and submitting a letter to Customs 
indicating their intent to comply with the requirements.205  This 
appeal also dealt with 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c), which requires notice and 
comment procedures before issuing an interpretive ruling that 
changes a pre-existing “treatment.”206  Under regulations issued in 
2002, Customs limited certain “substantially identical transactions” 
requiring § 1625(c) “treatment” to only the transactions of the 
person requesting the “treatment.”207 
Under this statutory framework, CIP sought to obtain drawbacks 
for steel trim or scrap it produced in its steel conversion mills that 
manufacture flat-rolled steel sheet products.208  CIP filed a letter of 
intent to comply with a general Customs drawback contract for 
manufactured steel articles and filed drawback claims pursuant to 
that contract.209  Customs denied CIP’s claims, stating that drawback is 
not allowed on scrap and basing its denial on a new headquarters 
ruling letter in response to the drawback claims of another company, 
despite having previously liquidated drawbacks for steel scrap for 
                                                          
 202. Id. at 1343 (holding that “Customs was bound by this previous favorable 
treatment”). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. (highlighting that 19 U.S.C. § 1313(b) limits the availability of drawback 
to within three years of the receipt of the imported merchandise). 
 205. Id. at 1344 (mentioning 19 C.F.R. §§ 191.2(f), 191.42 which provide that 
Customs’ acknowledgment of receipt of the letter of intent validates the general 
contract for fifteen years and permits manufacturers thereafter to submit individual 
claims for drawback based on the general contract). 
 206. Id. (providing thirty days after publication for interested parties to submit 
comments on the proposal and another thirty days for the Secretary to issue a final 
decision). 
 207. 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) (2000).  
 208. Cal. Indus. Prods., 436 F.3d at 1345 (recalling that CIP’s steel at issue in the 
case was purchased from domestic companies and therefore import duties on such 
steel were already paid). 
 209. Id. at 1346 (referring to T.D. 81-74, which specifically disallowed drawback 
for any waste resulting from the exported articles). 
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other companies.210  Customs then began denying all claims for 
drawbacks on steel scrap.211 
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s holding under 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1625(c) that Customs was required to conduct notice and comment 
proceedings before changing its practice through the headquarters 
ruling letter.212  In affirming, the Federal Circuit found that Customs 
did issue an “interpretive ruling or decision” to CIP, as required for 
the application of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c).213  In addition, the Federal 
Circuit held that the language of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) indicated that 
Congress intended that transactions between Customs and multiple 
parties be “substantially identical transactions.”214  Contrary to 
Customs’ 2002 regulations, the Federal Circuit found that “use of the 
words ‘interested parties’ indicates that Congress intended, contrary 
to 19 C.F.R. § 177.12(c)(1)(iii)(A), that ‘substantially identical 
transactions’ forming the basis of a ‘treatment’ include transactions 
other than transactions of just the person before Customs claiming 
the right to a notice and comment process.”215  The Federal Circuit 
found that Customs could still change its treatment, but that it was 
required to use notice and comment procedures pursuant to 19 
U.S.C. § 1625(c) before changing the treatment.216 
II. TRADE REMEDY LAWS 
A. U.S. Department of Commerce 
The United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”), along 
with the ITC, is responsible for conducting antidumping and 
countervailing duty investigations.  In an antidumping investigation, 
                                                          
 210. Id. (noting that the headquarter ruling stated that scrap was waste, therefore 
disallowed from drawback). 
 211. Id. (discussing the successful appeal by Precision, another steel corporation, 
to the CIT of Customs’ denial of a portion of its drawback claims, in which the Court 
determined that Customs’ grant of drawbacks for the majority of the corporation’s 
claims constituted a “treatment,” by which Customs was bound). 
 212. Id. at 1350. 
 213. Id. at 1351 (characterizing Customs’ March 13, 1998 protest review decision 
as within the meaning of “ruling and decision” in 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c)). 
 214. Id. at 1353-56 (noting that while “substantially identical transactions” was not 
defined by statute, congressional intent was clear based on reading the statute as a 
whole and legislative intent to create transparency of Customs’ actions, and referring 
to pre-existing law at the time of the creation of the statute, which provided that 
“treatment” included transactions of multiple parties). 
 215. Id. at 1354 (reasoning that the previous treatment of Precision, permitting 
drawback on steel scrap, was a “substantially identical transaction” such that CIP had 
the right to a notice and comment process under § 1625(c)). 
 216. Id. (comparing the current statute to its predecessor, 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(c), 
which required publication of notice in the Federal Register each time Customs was 
reviewing a potential change of position). 
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Commerce determines whether the imports subject to the 
investigation are, or are likely to be, sold at less than fair value.217  In a 
countervailing duty investigation, Commerce determines whether a 
government or public entity is providing a countervailable subsidy 
regarding the manufacture, export, or production of a product 
subject to investigation.218  A finding of dumping or a countervailable 
subsidy at a margin that is more than de minimis, when combined 
with an affirmative ITC finding, as discussed below, results in the 
imposition of an antidumping or countervailing duty order.  
Commerce also conducts annual administrative reviews of existing 
antidumping and countervailing duty orders to determine the actual 
margin of liability for imports subject to the order over the prior year, 
as well as other proceedings, such as scope inquiries and changed 
circumstances reviews, upon request.  In addition, Commerce, along 
with the ITC, conducts mandatory five-year reviews of existing orders 
with Commerce determining whether the revocation of an 
antidumping or countervailing duty order would lead to the 
continuation or recurrence of dumping or subsidization. 
The cases discussed below touch on the range of Commerce’s 
responsibilities in administering U.S. unfair trade laws.  During 2003-
2006, the Federal Circuit addressed aspects of Commerce’s 
calculation of antidumping and countervailing duty margins, the 
division of responsibility between Commerce and Customs, issues 
involving Commerce’s liquidation instructions, and jurisdictional 
issues in appeals of Commerce unfair trade determinations. 
In Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States,219 the Federal Circuit affirmed 
the CIT’s decision to remand Commerce’s administrative review 
determination regarding cylindrical roller bearings from, inter alia, 
Germany and to investigate Timken U.S. Corporation and Timken 
Nadellager, GmbH’s (“Timken’s”) evidence supporting correction of 
alleged errors associated with Timken’s home market sales.220  In 
addition, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s support of 
Commerce’s subsequent redetermination and refusal to correct the 
alleged errors on remand.221  This case involved Commerce’s tenth 
annual administrative review and included bearings imported by 
Timken to the United States.222  It is perhaps most interesting for its 
                                                          
 217. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(1) (2000). 
 218. 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(a)(1) (2000). 
 219. 434 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See id. at 1347 (referring to section 751 of the Tariff Act of 1930 which 
provides for periodic reviews of antidumping duty orders, 19 U.S.C. § 1481). 
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clarification of earlier Federal Circuit decisions regarding 
Commerce’s ability to correct importer errors. 
In Commerce’s original investigation, Commerce requested that 
Timken identify the channels of distribution for its home market 
sales.223  Timken categorized its sales into five channels, which were 
subsequently redesignated by Commerce in its preliminary results 
into three categories based on whether the point at which selling 
activities occurred was distinguishable.224  After reviewing 
Commerce’s preliminary results, Timken argued to Commerce that 
Timken had made certain “clerical” errors in reporting its sales and 
submitted invoices and purchase orders for the allegedly 
miscategorized sales.225  In its final results, Commerce refused to 
change its preliminary results.226  Using a test established in an earlier 
case, Commerce decided not to make Timken’s corrections because 
it found that the errors were not clerical and that the new 
information was not reliable.227  On appeal, the CIT remanded to 
Commerce (although agreeing that Timken’s error was not 
“clerical”) because the court was concerned that Commerce’s 
application of its test would result in a grossly erroneous dumping 
margin and because it was unclear what evidence contradicted 
Timken’s new evidence.228  On remand, Commerce noted its 
disagreement with the CIT, but nevertheless reviewed Timken’s new 
evidence and found that the use of this information would not result 
in a more accurate dumping margin because the new information 
was not sufficiently supported, whereas Commerce had verified the 
original information.229  The CIT affirmed Commerce’s 
redetermination. 
In its review of this case, the Federal Circuit first disagreed with the 
government that the CIT erred in remanding the case for further 
                                                          
 223. Id. 
 224. See id. (reclassifying the channels based on an examination of Timken’s 
“selling activities, the point in the channel of distribution at which the selling 
activities occurred, and the types of customers that purchased the subject bearings”). 
 225. See id. at 1347-48 (identifying seventeen transactions as channel one instead 
of channel two and three, which ultimately resulted in an inaccurate dumping 
margin). 
 226. See id. at 1348 (asserting that the new information conflicted with 
information in the record and that the late submission of the new information 
prevented Commerce from verifying it). 
 227. See id. (citing Certain Fresh Cut Flowers from Colombia; Final Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,833 (Aug. 19, 1996)) 
(discussing a two-part test for determining whether to substitute the new information 
and recalculate the dumping margin in which the substitution can be made if the 
error is clerical and the new evidence is reliable). 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1348-49. 
BAJ.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:13:26 AM 
1050 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Vol. 56:4 
investigation.230  The Federal Circuit rejected the government’s 
bright-line rule regarding what kinds of errors may be corrected in 
the context of antidumping duty determinations and clarified that its 
holdings regarding limitations on the correction of importer errors 
in NTN Bearing Corp. v. United States231 and Alloy Piping Products, Inc. v. 
United States,232 on which the government had relied, were “premised 
exclusively on timeliness.”233  The Federal Circuit additionally held 
“that Commerce is free to correct any type of importer error—
clerical, methodology, substantive, or one in judgment—in the 
context of making an antidumping duty determination, provided that 
the importer seeks correction before Commerce issues its final results 
and adequately proves the need for the requested corrections.”234 
Regarding the substance of Timken’s requested reclassification of 
its home market sales, the Federal Circuit found that, while a “close 
case,” Timken’s new evidence was not strong enough to require 
reclassification.235  The court reviewed the evidence in detail and 
found that Commerce’s rejection of each piece of evidence was 
reasonable as much of the evidence was unsubstantiated, while the 
evidence supporting Commerce’s original determination was 
substantial.236 
 In Royal Thai Government v. United States,237 the Federal Circuit 
addressed Commerce’s investigation of countervailable subsidies to 
the Thai steel industry.238  Here, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT 
holdings:  (1) affirming Commerce’s determination that Sahaviriya 
Steel Industries Public Company Limited’s (“SSI’s”) debt 
restructuring was not specific and therefore not countervailable; and 
(2) affirming Commerce’s decision not to investigate United States 
Steel Corporation’s (“U.S. Steel’s”) allegation of equity infusions.239  
                                                          
 230. See id. at 1351 (addressing the argument because it was dispositive as to the 
appeal). 
 231. 74 F.3d 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the decision was not based on a 
distinction in the type of error but the timeliness of the request for correction). 
 232. 334 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that Commerce was not absolutely 
required by either statute or regulation to correct “clerical” errors made by the 
importer because the statute and regulation govern only actions by Commerce, not 
the importer). 
 233. See Timken, 434 F.3d at 1351 (rejecting the government’s contention that 
once Commerce calculated the dumping margin, errors in underlying data could 
only be corrected where the error was clerical). 
 234. Id. at 1353. 
 235. Id. at 1356. 
 236. Id. at 1354-57 (concluding that Timken failed to provide sufficient, 
corroborated evidence of the alleged misrepresentations and that the 
reclassifications were supported by Timken’s description of its own channels). 
 237. 436 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. at 1332. 
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In the same opinion, the Federal Circuit also reversed the CIT’s 
holding “reversing Commerce’s decision to countervail the entire 
amount of import duty exemptions . . . provided to SSI.”240 
The Federal Circuit first held that it was not unreasonable for 
Commerce to compare the magnitudes of the restructured debts in 
lieu of the extensive investigation proposed by U.S. Steel when 
determining whether SSI’s debt restructuring was specific.241  U.S. 
Steel had argued that Commerce should compare the terms of each 
loan before and after restructuring, while Commerce had 
determined that such calculations were impracticable due to 
difficulties in obtaining the necessary information.242 
Second, the Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence, 
including a United Nations investment report supporting a steel-
making plant in Thailand, supported Commerce’s determination 
that there was not “a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that SSI 
received an equity infusion that provide[d] a countervailable 
benefit.”243 
Finally, the Federal Circuit deferred to Commerce in holding that 
the whole import duty exemption program was unreasonable because 
it systematically allowed impermissible drawback of recoverable and 
resaleable scrap.244  Commerce’s consideration of the reasonableness 
of the program utilized generally acceptable accounting principles 
used outside Thailand and the court therefore supported 
Commerce’s decision to countervail the entire amount of import 
duty exemptions.245 
                                                          
 240. Id. 
 241. See id. at 1336 (acknowledging the strength of U.S. Steel’s suggestion, but 
reasoning that an analysis of the magnitude would be roughly proportional to the 
benefits conferred). 
 242. Id. at 1335 (stating that U.S. Steel’s proposal would require Commerce first 
to  compare the interest rate and repayment schedule before and after the 
restructuring to determine the benefit conferred and then compare the benefits 
between companies and industries). 
 243. Id. at 1337 (dismissing U.S. Steel’s argument that the Royal Thai Government 
“induced bidders to invest in an unequityworthy company” through substantial 
subsidies). 
 244. Id. at 1339 (deferring to Commerce’s decision that a system that does not 
separately account for recoverable and resaleable scrap is unreasonable in light of its 
finding that the normal allowance of waste does not include allowing drawbacks for 
such scrap). 
 245. Id. at 1340 (referring to 19 C.F.R. § 351.519(a)(4), which permits Commerce 
to countervail the entire amount of the drawback unless the home country conforms 
to certain procedures or applies a system that confirms which inputs are consumed 
in the production of exported products and rejecting the Royal Thai Government’s 
assertion that Commerce’s analysis of reasonableness should be based on accounting 
practices in the home country). 
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In Viraj Group, Ltd. v. United States,246 the Federal Circuit reversed 
the CIT, holding that the CIT improperly failed to give priority to a 
statutory provision regarding the choice of exchange rates in 
antidumping investigations.  In this case, Commerce conducted an 
antidumping duty investigation in which, as part of its calculations of 
a dumping margin, Commerce used the rupee-dollar exchange rate 
on the date of a Viraj Group, Ltd. (“Viraj”) purchase order, which 
Commerce determined to be the date of sale of the relevant subject 
merchandise.247  The exchange rate selected did not take into account 
the over ten percent devaluation of the rupee over the period of 
investigation after the date of sale.248  On appeal, the CIT disagreed 
with Commerce’s choice of an exchange rate, finding the result to be 
absurd.249 
The Federal Circuit disagreed.  The court found that “[b]oth a 
statute and a regulation provide specifically and clearly that, with 
exceptions not relevant to this case, Commerce is to utilize an 
exchange rate on the date of sale.”250  The Federal Circuit found that 
concern over the accuracy of dumping margins could not compel 
Commerce to ignore the unambiguous and specific statutory 
mandate regarding the date of currency exchange rates for use in its 
determinations.251 
Also of interest in this opinion, the Federal Circuit clarified that 
the government had standing to file this appeal despite the fact that 
the government had, in response to the CIT’s direction, issued a 
remand determination that was affirmed by the CIT.252  Thus, even 
though the government’s decision was affirmed by the CIT, the court 
found that a justiciable case or controversy existed, stating that “the 
government prevailed only because it acquiesced and abandoned its 
original position, which it had zealously advocated, and adopted 
under protest a contrary position forced upon it by the court.  Thus, 
                                                          
 246. 343 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 247. See id. (citing Viraj Group, Ltd. v. United States (Viraj I), 162 F. Supp. 2d 656 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2001)). 
 248. Id. at 1374. 
 249. Id. (citing Viraj I, 162 F. Supp. 2d at 662). 
 250. See id. at 1374-75 (discussing Chevron deference afforded first to an 
unambiguous statute, then to agency interpretation, where interpretative issues exist 
and citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677b-1 (2000) and 19 C.F.R. § 351.415 (2002)).  
 251. Id. at 1375 (finding that Commerce’s sale-date exchange rate is more 
accurate in achieving an accurate dumping margin than CIT’s purchase date 
exchange rate). 
 252. Id. at 1375 (recalling the general rule that a judicial remand to an agency is 
not final and therefore not appealable). 
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in substance, the government is truly the non-prevailing party in this 
case.”253 
In Tung Mung Development Co., Ltd., v. United States,254 the Federal 
Circuit addressed whether Commerce was required to assess 
antidumping duties on all exported merchandise of a foreign 
producer at a single weighted average rate, even if some sales were 
made by a reseller.  Here, the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT in 
upholding Commerce’s decision not to use a single weighted average 
rate. 
In this case, the foreign producers sold some of their own 
merchandise in the United States and also sold some of their 
merchandise to a reseller, who sold the merchandise to its U.S. 
customers.255  In two antidumping investigations, Commerce 
originally calculated a single weighted average rate, but on remand 
calculated combination rates, whereby the foreign producers were 
responsible only for their own dumping and not that of middlemen 
resellers.256  In so doing, Commerce adopted a knowledge-based 
standard.257  Under this standard, a foreign producer’s merchandise 
that was not exported through a reseller would not be assessed duties 
for the reseller’s dumping if Commerce had “no basis to believe or 
suspect that the producer was aware or should have been aware that 
the middleman would be likely to dump subject merchandise into the 
United States.”258  Commerce also stated that this was not a “settled 
practice” due to its limited experience with middleman dumping.259 
On appeal, the court found that Commerce did not previously 
have a settled practice in this area and that Commerce had 
                                                          
 253. Id. at 1376 (arguing that the Finkelstein exception to the finality requirement 
for appealing a decision applied to this case as the court held “accuracy in 
antidumping margin determination is a goal that can override a specific statute”). 
 254. 354 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 255. Id. at 1374 (separating the transactions into three categories: “direct sales by 
producers to United States customers, sales by producers to the middleman, and 
sales by the middlemen to United States customers”). 
 256. Id. at 1379 (referring to the Supreme Court’s holding in Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983), that an agency could change 
its practice or policy if it could give a reasoned analysis for doing so). 
 257. Id. at 1377. 
 258. Id. at 1377-78 (quoting Alleghany Ludlum Corp. v. United States, No. 99-06-
00369, slip op. at 3-4 (Dep’t Commerce Nov. 28, 2001), and Tung Mung Dev. Co. v. 
United States, No. 99-06-00457, slip op. at 3-4 (Dep’t Commerce Nov. 28, 2001)) 
(rationalizing its standard by suggesting it would encourage producers to find 
middlemen who would not dump into the United States while not penalizing 
producers for such dumping where they were not responsible). 
 259. Id. at 1378. 
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adequately explained why a combination rate was appropriate here.260  
The Federal Circuit also found that it was Commerce’s choice as to 
the wisdom and efficiency of the use of a knowledge-based standard 
in determining whether to calculate a combination rate.261  
Therefore, the court affirmed the CIT’s affirmance of Commerce’s 
redetermination using a combination rate. 
Senior Circuit Judge Friedman dissented in part, finding that the 
prevailing parties were entitled to recover their costs of appeal under 
rule 39 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.262  Judge 
Friedman issued a dissent on this minor issue due to his concern 
about “what appears to me to be an increasing practice by the court 
routinely to deny costs to the prevailing party.”263 
In a case involving how strictly Commerce must enforce its notice 
regulation, PAM S.p.A v. United States,264 the Federal Circuit reversed 
the CIT’s judgment and held that rescission of a completed 
administrative review is not a proper remedy for failure to serve a 
request for administrative review on a party where the party does not 
demonstrate substantial prejudice.  In this case, the petitioner filed a 
request for an administrative review, but failed to serve PAM, S.p.A. 
(“PAM”), a foreign pasta producer, as required by 19 C.F.R. 
§ 351.303(f)(3)(ii).265  Commerce subsequently published notice of its 
initiation of the administrative review and listed PAM as a 
respondent.  During the review, PAM informed Commerce that it 
had not been properly served, but did not request rescission of the 
review.266  Instead, PAM requested, and Commerce granted, 
numerous extension requests in responding to Commerce’s 
questionnaires.267  In interpreting Commerce’s notice regulation, the 
Federal Circuit held that the CIT should have analyzed whether PAM 
proved substantial prejudice, regardless of whether the regulation 
                                                          
 260. See id. at 1380 (citing Commerce’s use of the combination rate in Fuel 
Ethanol from Brazil; Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value, 51 Fed. 
Reg. 5,572 (Feb. 14, 1986)). 
 261. Id. at 1381 (deferring to Commerce’s decision regarding which calculation 
method would be more efficient). 
 262. Id. at 1382 (Friedman, J., dissenting) (countering the majority’s argument, 
which relied on Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(a), that the awarding of 
costs is discretionary as the relevant statute states “unless . . . the court orders 
otherwise”). 
 263. Id. at 1382-83 (suggesting that costs should be awarded without regard to the 
“merit of the losing party’s arguments or its financial situation”). 
 264. 463 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 265. See id. at 1347 (noting that the regulation at issue provides that: “[A]n 
interested party that files with the Department a request for . . . an administrative 
review . . . must serve a copy of the request on each exporter . . .”). 
 266. Id. at 1346. 
 267. Id. at 1346-47. 
BAJ.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:13:26 AM 
2007   2006 INTERNATIONAL TRADE SUMMARY 1055 
conferred an important procedural benefit on foreign companies.268  
In addition, under the circumstances of this case, the Federal Circuit 
found that no substantial prejudice was shown as a matter of law as 
PAM received notice of the review only seventeen days after it should 
have been served, was granted extensions during the review in excess 
of seventeen days, and did not claim that it was impeded by the 
service failure in its ability to respond to or defend its interests in the 
review.269 
In Elkem Metals Co. v. United States,270 the Federal Circuit held that 
the CIT erred when it overturned Commerce’s exclusion of the value-
added tax (“VAT”) paid by a Brazilian producer on its production 
inputs from constructed value.271  This appeal arose from Commerce’s 
administrative review of an antidumping order of silicon metal from 
Brazil for the period between July 1, 1999 and June 30, 2000.272  In 
this review, Commerce applied its policy “of making a case-by-case 
inquiry as to whether an exporter/producer is able to fully offset its 
VAT liability by using its VAT credits.”273  Under Commerce’s policy, 
VAT is included as a cost for purposes of calculating constructed 
value to the extent that an exporter/producer does not fully use the 
VAT credits generated by export sales under Brazilian law.274  
Applying this policy, Commerce determined that the Brazilian 
producer had fully recovered its outlays for VAT on inputs 
corresponding to exported goods and, therefore, excluded the VAT 
on the producer’s inputs from the constructed value calculation.275  
Based on the resulting constructed value, Commerce determined the 
Brazilian producer’s dumping margin to be de minimis.276 
Following an appeal to the CIT by Elkem Metals Co. (“Elkem”), the 
CIT held that Commerce “must include such internal taxes paid on 
inputs in its calculation of constructed value” when the taxes are not 
refunded or remitted upon exportation of the subject merchandise.277  
The CIT also found that the Brazilian producer’s use of VAT credits 
to purchase inputs, as permitted under Brazilian law, “did not 
                                                          
 268. Id. at 1348. 
 269. See id. at 1349 (explaining that the total amount of additional time that 
Commerce granted to PAM “far exceeded” the seventeen days lost due to lack of 
service). 
 270. 468 F.3d 795 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 271. Id. at 797. 
 272. Id. at 798. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See id. (explaining that antidumping duties would not be assessed on 
imported silicon because of the de minimis dumping margin). 
 277. Id. at 799 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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constitute a remittance or refund upon exportation.”278  On remand, 
Commerce recalculated constructed value pursuant to the CIT’s 
directions and found that the producer’s dumping margin was higher 
than at the time of the first remand, but still de minimis.279  The CIT 
sustained Commerce’s redetermination.  Elkem appealed 
Commerce’s decision to rely on the producer’s questionnaire 
responses as a proper accounting for VAT, while Commerce (and the 
producer) cross-appealed, arguing that VAT should have been 
excluded from the constructed value calculation.280 
In accordance with Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.,281 the Federal Circuit first reviewed the language of the 
statutory provision regarding constructed value, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1677b(e).282  The Federal Circuit found that under section 
1677b(e), Commerce would be required to exclude Brazilian VAT 
from constructed value if it were refunded or remitted upon export, 
but that the statute includes no requirement that Commerce include 
VAT not refunded or remitted upon export because Congress has not 
“directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”283  Under the 
second prong of the Chevron test, the Federal Circuit held that 
Commerce’s policy of individual determinations regarding the extent 
to which VAT is a cost was a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute.284  As a result, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT had 
accorded Commerce insufficient deference regarding its policy of 
excluding VAT from constructed value, and reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings.  Based on this decision, the Federal Circuit 
also held Elkem’s appeal to be moot.285 
Norsk Hydro Canada, Inc. v. United States286 involved the division of 
authority between Commerce and Customs in implementing U.S. 
countervailing duty law.287  Here, Customs had collected 
countervailing duties from Norsk Hydro Canada, Inc. (“NHC”) at a 
“deemed liquidated rate” ranging from about three percent to seven 
percent instead of the proper countervailing duty rate of 2.02% as 
calculated by Commerce during an administrative review of NHC’s 
                                                          
 278. Id. 
 279. See id. at 799-800 (stating that the dumping margin was 0.48%). 
 280. Id. at 800. 
 281. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 282. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (2000) (describing the calculation of a constructed 
value for imported merchandise); Chevron, 467 U.S. 837. 
 283. Elkem Metals, 468 F.3d at 801. 
 284. See id. at 802 (noting with approval that Commerce promulgated its policy on 
the exclusion of VAT through note and comment rulemaking). 
 285. Id. at 803. 
 286. 472 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 287. Id. at 1348. 
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1997 magnesium and magnesium alloy imports.288  (“Deemed 
liquidation” takes place if entries are not actually liquidated within six 
months of the removal of suspension of liquidation when Commerce 
instructs Customs about the proper countervailing duty rate following 
an annual administrative review.  As the court noted here “[w]hile 
actual liquidation occurs at the rate instructed by Commerce, 
deemed liquidation under [19 U.S.C.] § 1504(d) occurs at the 
(sometimes higher, sometimes lower) cash deposit rate”).289  NHC did 
not protest the overcharge by Customs, but instead sought a setoff of 
the overcharge against duties due on its imports for 2001 through a 
Commerce administrative review of NHC’s 2001 entries.  Commerce 
refused to grant the setoff, citing a lack of statutory authority.290  On 
appeal, the CIT remanded to Commerce with instructions to grant 
the setoff. 
The Federal Circuit reversed.  Citing 19 U.S.C. § 1675 (for 
Commerce administrative reviews of subsidy determinations) and 19 
U.S.C. § 1514(a)(5) (for Customs protests for liquidation errors), the 
court noted that “the procedures for contesting an erroneous subsidy 
calculation [made by Commerce] are different from those for 
contesting an erroneous duty assessment [by Customs].”291  While 
Commerce determines the amount of any net countervailable subsidy 
in an administrative review, it typically calculates the countervailing 
duty rate based only on entries made during the one-year period of 
the review.292  Customs, on the other hand, liquidates entries and 
collects the duty by applying the calculated rate to the value of the 
entered merchandise.293  The court noted that “[a] liquidation 
decision itself is ‘final and conclusive’ as to all parties, including the 
United States, unless protested with Customs, and this is so even if 
the liquidation contains a ‘clerical error, mistake of fact, or other 
inadvertence’ adverse to the importer.”294 
NHC argued that Commerce was required to take into account 
Customs’ past liquidation errors because 19 U.S.C. § 1671 requires 
the “duty imposed” to be “equal to the amount of the net 
                                                          
 288. Id. 
 289. 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (2000) (providing that “[a]ny entry . . . not liquidated by 
the Customs Service within 6 months after receiving such notice shall be treated as 
having been liquidated at the rate of duty, value, quantity, and amount of duty 
asserted at the time of entry by the importer of record”); Norsk Hydro, 472 F.3d at 
1351. 
 290. Id. at 1358-59 (relying on 68 Fed. Reg. 53,962 (Sept. 15, 2003)). 
 291. Id. at 1350. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 1351. 
 294. Id. at 1352. 
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countervailing subsidy.”295  The Federal Circuit disagreed and held 
that Commerce properly imposed the countervailing duties for 1997 
when it entered an order instructing Customs about the 2.02% rate 
for that period and it was entitled to assume that Customs would 
follow its instructions.296  In addition, the court held that Commerce’s 
refusal to consider the 1997 entries during its review of NHC’s 2001 
entries was a permissible interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1675, 
particularly as Commerce conducts its administrative reviews on an 
annual basis, making it “duplicative and wasteful for later reviews to 
revisit matters subject to review in prior PORs [periods of review].”297  
The Federal Circuit therefore reversed and remanded to the CIT so 
that the setoff issued by Commerce at the direction of the CIT could 
be vacated. 
In Consolidated Bearings Co. v. United States,298 the Federal Circuit 
found that the CIT was correct in its decision to find jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), and agreed with the CIT that the 
exhaustion doctrine did not apply under the facts in this case 
(although for a different reason than the CIT).299  However, in 
considering the merits, the court determined that the CIT erred in its 
interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(C), and vacated and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.300 
In this case, Consolidated Bearings Co. (“Consolidated”) 
challenged Commerce’s 1998 liquidation instructions directing 
Customs to liquidate all entries of antifriction bearings from 
Germany (which were subject to an antidumping duty order) that 
were not liquidated by the instructions that Commerce issued in 
1997.301  The 1997 instructions had implemented the final results of a 
Commerce antidumping administrative review for participating 
importers.  Consolidated had purchased antifriction bearings from 
Germany produced by FAG Kugelfischer Georg Schaefer KgaA 
(“FAG”) from an unrelated reseller, and imported those bearings 
into the United States between 1989 and 1997.302  Consolidated paid 
cash deposits for antidumping duties based on the rates assigned to 
FAG and did not participate in Commerce’s administrative review.  
Under Commerce’s 1998 instructions, Customs liquidated 
                                                          
 295. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (2000); Norsk Hydro, 472 F.3d at 1358. 
 296. Id. at 1358. 
 297. Id. at 1361. 
 298. 348 F.3d 997 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 299. Id. at 999-1000 (differing as to whether the “pure question of law” provision 
applies). 
 300. Id. at 1007-08. 
 301. Id. at 1001. 
 302. Id. at 1000. 
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Consolidated’s entries at the cash deposit rate instead of at the 
significantly lower rates for importers who participated in the 
administrative review.303  Consolidated appealed to the CIT. 
Here, the Federal Circuit held that the CIT had jurisdiction under 
the CIT’s residual jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) because 
Consolidated was not challenging Commerce’s final administrative 
review results, which are reviewable only under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c), 
but was instead seeking application of those final results to its entries 
of antifriction bearings manufactured by FAG.304  The Federal Circuit 
found that “an action challenging Commerce’s liquidation 
instructions is not a challenge to the final results, but a challenge to 
the ‘administration and enforcement’ of those final results” for which 
28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(4) grants jurisdiction.305  In a related holding, the 
Federal Circuit found that Consolidated’s appeal should not be 
dismissed for a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, despite the 
fact that Consolidated did not participate in the administrative 
review, because Consolidated was challenging the liquidation 
instructions and not the administrative review itself.306 
Regarding the merits of the appeal, the court found that 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1675(a)(2)(C) required Commerce to apply its final administrative 
review results to all entries covered by the review and that “[i]f the 
review did not examine a particular importer’s transaction, then that 
importer’s entries enjoy no statutory entitlement to the rates 
established by the review.”307  Here, because the reseller that exported 
the bearings to Consolidated was not covered by the review, the court 
found that Consolidated’s imports were not within the scope of the 
review or the 1997 instructions.308  However, the Federal Circuit 
remanded the case to the CIT for additional proceedings regarding 
whether Commerce’s 1998 instructions arbitrarily departed from its 
past practice.  The court found that the CIT needed to supplement 
the record for this case with a comparison of the 1998 instructions 
with Commerce’s actions in similar circumstances before this case to 
determine whether Commerce had a consistent past practice 
regarding imports from unrelated resellers not covered by a review 
                                                          
 303. Id. at 1001. 
 304. Id. at 1001-02. 
 305. Id. at 1002. 
 306. Id. at 1003-04 (noting that the record did not disclose a statutory or 
regulatory provision that would have allowed a party to challenge Commerce’s 
administrative review). 
 307. Id. at 1005-06. 
 308. Id. at 1006. 
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and whether the 1998 instructions departed from this past practice 
without reasonable explanation.309 
In Belgium v. United States,310 the Federal Circuit reversed and 
remanded the CIT’s denial of a request made by Arcelor, an importer 
of stainless steel plate in coils (“SSPC”), for a preliminary injunction 
to prevent Customs from liquidating certain entries in an appeal of 
Commerce’s liquidation instructions.  The CIT had denied Arcelor’s 
request because it found that Arcelor failed to make a persuasive case 
of irreparable harm or likelihood of success on the merits.311 
Arcelor mistakenly declared Belgium, instead of Germany, to be 
the country of origin of its steel imports between 1998 and 2002.312  
SSCP from Belgium were subject to antidumping and countervailing 
duties during that time.  When Arcelor discovered the error, it filed 
disclosures and timely protests with Customs to correct the country of 
origin.313  Arcelor also disclosed the error to Commerce in the fourth 
administrative review of the antidumping duty order of SSCP from 
Belgium.314  Commerce determined that the correction of the country 
of origin would apply to entries covered by the fourth review and 
future entries, but not prior entries, and instructed Customs to 
liquidate prior entries as though they were subject to the SSPC from 
Belgium order.315  Arcelor filed protests with Customs for the 
liquidated entries and a complaint with the CIT regarding the 
liquidation instructions for the unliquidated entries.316  Arcelor also 
requested a preliminary injunction, which the CIT denied.317 
On appeal regarding the denial of the injunction, the Federal 
Circuit remanded for entry of a preliminary injunction.  The Federal 
Circuit first found that, while Commerce may turn out to be correct 
in its conclusion that Arcelor’s “country-of-origin designations were 
applicable only to entries in the fourth administrative review period 
and later” regardless of whether or not they were liquidated, the issue 
was not “so clear cut” that the court was ready to dispose of the 
appeal based on a lack of likelihood of success on the merits.318  
Regarding the balance of hardships, the Federal Circuit found that 
                                                          
 309. Id. at 1008. 
 310. 452 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 311. Ugine & ALZ Belgium, N.V. v. United States, 391 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289-90 
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2005), rev’d and remanded, 452 F.3d at 1297. 
 312. Belgium, 452 F.3d at 1290-91. 
 313. Id. at 1291. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 1295. 
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there was no strong public interest against injunctive relief.  The 
court then determined that Arcelor had made “a strong showing of 
irreparable harm” because the denial of a preliminary injunction 
could result in a denial of any opportunity for a decision on the 
merits of its claim.319  Finally, in remanding for the entry of a 
preliminary injunction, the court also stated that it gave strong weight 
to the fact that all parties had consented to a preliminary injunction 
before the CIT denied the injunction.320 
In a non-precedential opinion involving a Commerce antidumping 
duty determination, Agro Dutch Industries Ltd. v. United States,321 the 
Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings the 
CIT’s dismissal of a case appealing the final results of an antidumping 
duty administrative review on jurisdictional grounds.322  The CIT 
originally dismissed the case because the plaintiff had not responded 
to the court’s request for information about whether any entries of 
the subject merchandise for the period of review remained 
unliquidated.323  While Agro Dutch Industries, Ltd. had filed an 
appeal and been granted an injunction against liquidation of its 
entries, the injunction was not effective before Customs “liquidated 
many of the shipments that had entered the United States during the 
period of review.”324  The Federal Circuit found that the parties 
agreed that there remained unliquidated entries from the affected 
period (and that the CIT had not imposed a deadline on its request 
for information about the entries) and, as a result, found that “the 
jurisdictional ground on which the trial court initially dismissed the 
action cannot stand.”325  The Federal Circuit remanded to the CIT to 
address the complaint on the merits.  While the CIT had indicated 
that it was prepared to dispose of the case on the merits, in favor of 
the government, the Federal Circuit found that that discussion was 
not an alternative ground for decision by the CIT and therefore 
remanded to the CIT for further proceedings.326 
B.  United States International Trade Commission 
The United States International Trade Commission’s (“ITC’s”) 
area of expertise and responsibility in unfair trade cases, including 
                                                          
 319. Id. at 1297. 
 320. Id. 
 321. 167 F. App’x 202 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 322. Id. at 204-05. 
 323. Id. at 203. 
 324. Id. at 202. 
 325. Id. at 204. 
 326. Id. at 205 (remanding the case to the same trial court judge, notwithstanding 
Agro Dutch’s protestations). 
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antidumping and countervailing duty investigations and reviews, is 
the injury determination.327  More specifically, in an antidumping or 
countervailing duty investigation, the ITC must determine whether a 
U.S. industry is materially injured, or is threatened with material 
injury, by imports or sales of the subject merchandise, or whether 
imports or sales of the subject merchandise have materially retarded 
the establishment of a U.S. industry.328  Without an affirmative injury 
determination from the ITC, Commerce cannot issue an 
antidumping or countervailing duty order. 
While the ITC had relatively few unfair trade cases before the 
Federal Circuit in 2003 through 2006 compared with Commerce and 
Customs, several cases involving the ITC—most notably Nippon Steel 
Corp. v. United States329 and Bratsk Aluminium Smelter v. United States330—
were among the most interesting and potentially far-reaching trade 
cases decided by the court during this period. 
Nippon Steel is a case with a long procedural history, including four 
determinations by the ITC, four opinions from the CIT, and one 
prior Federal Circuit opinion.331  Prior to this 2006 Federal Circuit 
opinion, the ITC had ultimately issued, under protest, a negative 
material injury determination upon instruction from the CIT.332  The 
issue in this appeal was whether the ITC’s findings that dumping of 
Japanese imports of tin- and chromium-coated steel sheets (“TCCSS”) 
could be linked to price effects in, and causation of injury to, the 
domestic market such that the findings detracted from the evidence 
in support of injury as to render the ITC’s affirmative material injury 
determination unsupported by substantial evidence.333  Here, the 
Federal Circuit found that the ITC’s original affirmative material 
injury determination was supported by substantial evidence, and 
                                                          
 327. See, e.g.,  Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 458 F.3d 
1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining that Congress bifurcates the inquiry into 
antidumping allegations between Commerce and the ITC). 
 328. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2000). 
 329. 458 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 330. 444 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 331. 458 F.3d at 1347-50 (engaging in a “cursory” overview of the procedural 
history, citing the following cases: Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 182 F. Supp. 
2d 1330 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001) (Nippon I); Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 223 F. 
Supp. 2d 1349 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2002) (Nippon II); Nippon Steel Corp. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 345 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Nippon III); Nippon Steel Corp. v. United 
States, 350 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004) (Nippon IV); Nippon Steel Corp. v. 
United States, 2005 Ct. Int’l Trade LEXIS 40 (Mar. 23, 2005) (Nippon V)). 
 332. Id. at 1348. 
 333. Id. at 1347-48. 
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therefore reversed the CIT and directed it to reinstate the original 
affirmative ITC determination.334 
In evaluating the ITC’s analysis of the record evidence and the 
CIT’s holdings, the Federal Circuit found that, while it supported the 
CIT’s rejection of evidence of price effects containing 
miscalculations, it could not support the CIT’s rejection of the ITC’s 
analysis of certain domestic producer accounting data.335  In addition, 
the Federal Circuit found that there was substantial evidence on both 
sides of the issue of whether domestic producers were in a cost-price 
squeeze, and that the statutory substantial evidence standard 
required that the ITC’s conclusion that the domestic industry was in a 
cost-price squeeze be given deference.336  As a result, the Federal 
Circuit could not support the CIT’s conclusion regarding domestic 
price suppression.  Similarly, the Federal Circuit could not support 
the CIT’s rejections of ITC findings regarding conditions of 
competition in the domestic industry because it did not agree with 
the CIT that the ITC’s conditions of competition findings were 
unreasonable in light of the evidence as a whole.337  The Federal 
Circuit also concluded that the CIT “improperly substituted its own 
credibility determinations for those of the Commission” regarding 
causation.338  In making these conclusions, although noting that the 
CIT “may well have conducted a better analysis than did the 
Commission, and that we would have reached the same conclusion as 
the trade court if deciding the case in the first instance,”339 the 
Federal Circuit stated that “[t]he assessment of the proper weight to 
accord to testimony is within the role of the Commission, not this 
court and not the Court of International Trade.”340  As the Federal 
Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the ITC’s original 
affirmative material injury determination, it did not decide the scope 
of the CIT’s authority to reverse an ITC determination without 
remand.341 
In Bratsk Aluminium Smelter v. United States,342 the Federal Circuit 
vacated the CIT’s decision affirming the ITC’s determination that the 
                                                          
 334. Id. at 1354 (acknowledging, however, that substantial evidence existed to 
support the CIT’s findings). 
 335. Id. at 1353-54. 
 336. Id. at 1354. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 1357. 
 339. Id. at 1358. 
 340. Id. at 1356. 
 341. Id. at 1359 (explaining that the authority to reverse would come from 19 
U.S.C. § 1516(a), which outlines the provisions for judicial review in countervailing 
duty and antidumping proceedings). 
 342. 444 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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domestic silicon metal industry was materially injured by reason of 
Russian silicon metal imports sold at less than fair value.  In making 
an affirmative injury determination in an antidumping investigation, 
the ITC must determine both that the domestic industry is suffering 
from present material injury and that the material injury is “by reason 
of” the imports under consideration during the investigation 
(“subject imports”).343  This appeal dealt with whether the ITC 
properly established that the domestic industry was injured “by 
reason of” the subject imports.344  In considering the “by reason of” 
requirement, the Federal Circuit clarified its earlier decision in Gerald 
Metals, Inc. v. United States.345 
During its injury investigation in Bratsk, the ITC had not made a 
specific determination regarding whether non-subject imports of 
silicon metal, a commodity product, would simply replace subject 
imports if the subject imports were excluded from the U.S. market.  
The ITC had also dismissed Gerald Metals as factually 
distinguishable.346  The CIT affirmed the ITC’s decision without 
specifically discussing the causation issue.347 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit first noted that 
[w]here commodity products are at issue and fairly traded, price-
competitive, non-subject imports are in the market, the 
Commission must explain why the elimination of subject imports 
would benefit the domestic industry instead of resulting in the non-
subject imports’ replacement of the subject imports’ market share 
without any beneficial impact on domestic producers.348 
The Court clarified that 
[u]nder Gerald Metals, the increase in volume of subject imports 
priced below domestic products and the decline in the domestic 
market share are not in and of themselves sufficient to establish 
causation . . . . [U]nder Gerald Metals, the Commission is required 
to make a specific causation determination and in that connection 
to directly address whether non-subject imports would have 
replaced the subject imports without any beneficial effect on 
domestic producers.349 
The Federal Circuit expressed its concern that the ITC had not 
explained its causation analysis in accordance with Gerald Metals, 
instead limiting that case to its “unique facts.” The Federal Circuit 
                                                          
 343. Id. at 1371. 
 344. Id. at 1372. 
 345. 132 F.3d 716 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1373-74. 
 346. Bratsk, 444 F.3d at 1372. 
 347. See id. (affirming the Commission’s remand determination “in its entirety”). 
 348. Id. at 1373. 
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raised this concern despite the fact that this case, like Gerald Metals, 
involved an interchangeable product with significant non-subject 
imports sold at prices generally below domestic product prices during 
the period of investigation.350  Here, the court clarified that 
[t]he Commission is obligated to follow the holdings of our cases, 
not to limit those decisions to their particular facts.  The holding of 
Gerald Metals is not limited to situations in which non-subject 
imports increased during the period of review.  The obligation 
under Gerald Metals is triggered whenever the antidumping 
investigation is centered on a commodity product, and price 
competitive non-subject imports are a significant factor in the 
market.351 
The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the CIT so that it could 
remand back to the ITC to address whether the non-subject imports 
would have replaced subject imports and continued to cause injury to 
the domestic industry if subject imports were excluded from the U.S. 
market.352 
Senior Circuit Judge Archer dissented, finding that the ITC had 
“adequately considered” the effect of subject and non-subject imports 
and that “neither the statute nor Gerald Metals imposes the rigidity in 
findings or analysis that the majority seems to require.”353 
Caribbean Ispat Ltd. v. United States,354 involved an exception to the 
general rule under 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(G)(i) that the ITC must 
cumulate imports from all countries subject to an injury investigation 
when analyzing the volume, price, effect, and impact of subject 
imports.  In particular, Caribbean Ispat Limited’s (“CIL’s”) appeal 
focused on the application of the exception mandated by the 
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (“CBERA”),355  which 
exempts Caribbean nations from the cumulation rule, to the ITC’s 
investigation of imports of steel wire rod from Trinidad and 
Tobago.356 
The ITC took the position, upheld by the CIT, that the ITC was 
prohibited from considering the effect of subject imports from non-
CBERA countries when determining whether the domestic industry 
was materially injured “by reason of” imports from Trinidad and 
Tobago.357  The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that “the 
                                                          
 350. Id. at 1375. 
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 352. Id. at 1376. 
 353. Id. at 1376, 1378. 
 354. 450 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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Commission had authority to treat LTFV [less than fair value] 
imports from non-CBERA countries as an ‘other economic factor,’ 
just as the Commission ordinarily treats fairly traded imports as an 
‘other economic factor’ in dumping investigations that do not involve 
CBERA countries.”358  Citing its recent decision in Bratsk, the Federal 
Circuit also held that the ITC was required in this case to make a 
specific causation determination and address directly whether other 
imports (whether or not subject to the investigation) would have 
replaced Trinidad and Tobago’s imports without any positive effect 
on domestic producers.359  Therefore, the court remanded for further 
consideration of the causation analysis.360 
In Altx, Inc. v. United States,361 the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s 
decisions.  The court found that the CIT did not abuse its discretion 
when it remanded the Commission’s first remand determination in 
the appeal and also held that CIT’s second remand determination 
was supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.362 
This case involved an antidumping investigation of circular 
seamless stainless steel hollow products (“CSSSHP”) from Japan.363  In 
its original investigation, the ITC found that the domestic CSSSHP 
industry was not materially injured or threatened with material injury 
by reason of subject imports during the period of investigation, and 
issued a negative determination.364  On appeal, the CIT remanded to 
the ITC to consider the relevant arguments of the domestic 
producers.365  In its first remand, the ITC entered an affirmative 
determination of injury after a new member of the ITC joined the 
original dissent.366  The Japanese producers then appealed and the 
CIT again remanded to the ITC for additional consideration of 
arguments by the parties.367  On second remand, the ITC reinstated 
its original negative determination, again without any Commissioner 
changing its vote, as the temporary appointment of the 
Commissioner who had provided the decisive vote on remand 
expired, and also addressed the arguments of domestic producers in 
greater depth.368  The CIT affirmed the second remand 
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determination as it found that the ITC had addressed significant 
arguments and evidence undermining its reasoning and 
conclusions.369 
Here, while the court’s jurisdiction attached as a result of the CIT’s 
final decision affirming the second remand determination,370 the 
Federal Circuit noted that its jurisdiction “nonetheless encompasses 
the entirety of the proceedings before the court, including 
intermediate remand orders that would not, independently, be 
appealable.”371  The court found that it appropriately would review 
the CIT’s earlier decisions in this case under an “abuse of discretion” 
standard because the remand decisions did not evaluate the 
substantiality of the ITC’s evidence, but instead simply requested 
further explanation.372  The court reviewed the CIT’s final decision de 
novo in considering whether the ITC’s final remand determination 
was supported by “substantial evidence.”373 
In reviewing the CIT’s decisions, the Federal Circuit found that the 
CIT’s decision to remand after the first remand determination was 
justified due to the ITC’s “deficient treatment” of certain areas of 
evidence, including non-subject imports.374  As a result, the Federal 
Circuit did not reach the argument about whether the first remand 
determination was supported by substantial evidence.375  Regarding 
the second remand determination, the Federal Circuit held that the 
ITC’s views were supported by substantial evidence.376  The court 
found that the ITC was within its discretion to refuse to conform its 
decision to a theoretical economic model found to be inconsistent 
with empirical data.377  The court also found that the ITC’s findings 
regarding non-subject imports were supported by substantial 
evidence and that the ITC “is not required to determine that non-
subject imports are significant in order to conclude that the subject 
imports are not significant.”378  Finally, the Federal Circuit also found 
that the ITC’s decision to reject semi-annual data and rely solely on 
annual data was reasonable where there was a risk that the semi-
annual data was “incomplete, unrepresentative, or inaccurate.”379 
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III.   OTHER TRADE CASES 
A.  United States Trade Representative and Presidential Trade Authority 
In Gilda Industries, Inc. v. United States,380 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the CIT’s decision.  
This case involved a December 1985 prohibition by the European 
Community (“EC”) of imports of meat from animals treated with 
hormones.381  The United States challenged the prohibition at the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and ultimately received 
authorization by the WTO to increase its duties on EC products in 
response to the prohibition.382  Following the WTO’s ruling and 
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2416, the United States Trade Representative 
(“USTR”) created a “retaliation list,” which subjected certain EC 
products to increased duties of one hundred percent ad valorem.383  
Included on the list was HTSUS subheading 9903.02.35 for “[r]usks, 
toasted bread and similar products.”384  Gilda Industries, Inc. 
(“Gilda”), which imports toasted breads from Spain, appealed 
USTR’s retaliation list under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i).385  The Federal 
Circuit confirmed that jurisdiction was available under that provision 
because Gilda was appealing USTR’s action and not Customs’ 
classification of the entries.386 
Gilda first argued that retaliation lists may include only products 
affected by the foreign country’s noncompliance with the WTO’s 
ruling (“reciprocal goods”).387  The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding 
that, while the retaliation list must include reciprocal goods, it could 
also include nonreciprocal goods.388  The Federal Circuit also rejected 
Gilda’s argument that the list had expired because no domestic 
industry that “benefits from” the list had requested its continuation 
since the domestic beef industry had requested continuation and that 
industry benefits from any pressure the list places on foreign 
governments to comply with the WTO ruling.389 
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Gilda also argued that the USTR had failed to comply with 19 
U.S.C. § 2416(b)(2)(C), which requires the USTR to review and 
revise the list every 180 days because the USTR had not revised the 
list since its implementation in July 1999.390  While the Federal Circuit 
questioned Gilda’s standing to challenge this provision under the 
“zone of interests” test because Gilda could be seen as seeking relief 
that would frustrate the objectives of the statute,391 the Federal Circuit 
did not reach this question because the government waived the 
argument by not raising it in its brief.392  The Federal Circuit instead 
remanded this issue to the CIT to determine whether the USTR had 
determined that resolution of the hormone dispute is “imminent”—a 
determination which would have excused USTR from the 
requirement to review and revise the list.393  However, the court also 
found that Gilda is not entitled to a refund of duties paid or removal 
of its products from the list regardless of whether the USTR had 
complied with its duties to review and revise the list because the only 
remedy available is for the list to be reviewed and revised.394  The 
Federal Circuit also ruled that Gilda was entitled to notice and the 
opportunity to comment only when the list was originally created.395 
Finally, the Federal Circuit also ruled that Gilda could not 
challenge the implementation of the list on the ground that it 
violates the WTO’s recommendation by collecting duties in excess of 
those authorized by the WTO because WTO decisions are not 
binding on U.S. courts and 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1)(B) provides that 
no person other than the United States may challenge any action or 
inaction of the U.S. government on the ground that it is inconsistent 
with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.396 
In a case involving Presidential trade authority, Motions Systems 
Corp. v. Bush,397 the Federal Circuit addressed the President’s decision 
not to grant import relief to the U.S. pedestal actuator industry under 
section 421 of the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000.  Section 421 
established procedures for import relief by the President in the form 
of increased duties or other import restrictions by U.S. industries 
threatened by “market disruption” resulting from increased imports 
of products from China.398 
                                                          
 390. Id. at 1278. 
 391. Id. at 1280. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. at 1280-81. 
 394. Id. at 1284. 
 395. Id. at 1283-84. 
 396. Id. at 1284. 
 397. 437 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 398. Id. at 1357. 
BAJ.OFFTOPRINTER 4/7/2007  11:13:26 AM 
1070 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW Vol. 56:4 
In this case, Motion Systems Corporation (“Motion Systems”) 
properly filed a petition with the ITC alleging that imports of Chinese 
pedestal actuators had increased rapidly during 2000-2002, resulting 
in market disruption.399  The ITC conducted an investigation, made 
an affirmative finding of market disruption, and recommended that 
the President impose a quantitative restriction on the subject imports 
for a three-year period.400  However, the President exercised his 
discretion under the statute not to impose any relief, finding that 
such relief would only cause imports to shift to other offshore 
sources, and that any benefit to the domestic industry would be 
outweighed by the increased cost to downstream users and 
consumers.401 
Motion Systems sued the President and the USTR at the CIT 
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.402  After the CIT found in 
favor of the defendants, Motion Systems appealed to the Federal 
Circuit.403  In an en banc decision, the Federal Circuit found that 
there was no right of judicial review to challenge the acts of the 
President or USTR in this case.404  With no explicit statutory cause of 
action in section 421, the issue became whether Motion Systems 
could challenge the President’s discretionary actions under section 
421 as outside the scope of authority delegated to the President by 
Congress.405  The Federal Circuit determined that, under Dalton v. 
Specter,406 there is no right of judicial review available because section 
421 committed the decision about import relief to the discretion of 
the President, despite placing some limits on that discretion, and the 
President’s duties under section 421 were not purely ministerial.407  
The Federal Circuit also held that the CIT lacked jurisdiction to 
review the USTR’s actions because they were not final actions, but 
merely recommendations for Presidential action.408  In a concurring 
opinion, Circuit Judge Gajarsa disagreed with the majority’s 
determination of no right to judicial review, finding that “it is the 
judiciary’s role, and its duty, to review whether the President acted 
within the statutory parameters.”409  In reviewing the merits of this 
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case, Judge Gajarsa would have affirmed the CIT on the merits as he 
agreed with the CIT that there was “no basis to conclude that the 
President’s decision is based on a ‘clear misunderstanding of the 
governing statute’ or that it constituted ‘action outside his delegated 
authority.’”410 
B.  Trade Adjustment Assistance 
In Steen v. United States,411  the Federal Circuit upheld the CIT’s 
decision denying trade adjustment cash benefits to Ron Steen.  Mr. 
Steen had applied to the Department of Agriculture for cash benefits 
under the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (“Trade Act”), which 
provides for trade adjustment assistance for U.S. workers, including 
“agricultural commodity producers,” harmed by competition from 
imports.412  Under the Trade Act, producers may, among other 
things, apply for a cash benefit.413  In order to receive a benefit, 
however, producers must meet certain requirements, including that 
the producer’s “net farm income (as determined by the Secretary) 
for the most recent year is less than the producer’s net farm income 
for the latest year in which no adjustment assistance was received by 
the producer.”414  The regulations implementing the Trade Act clarify 
that that fishermen may also apply for assistance and that all 
producers must certify, among other things, that their “net farm or 
fishing income for the most recent tax year was less than that during 
the producer’s pre-adjustment year.”415 
Mr. Steen applied for cash benefits under the Trade Act as a 
fisherman of Pacific salmon.416  The Agriculture Department denied 
Mr. Steen’s application because he failed to show that his net fishing 
income in 2002 was lower than his net fishing income in 2001.417  Mr. 
Steen appealed to the CIT, arguing that his net fishing income 
should be calculated with respect to Pacific salmon (the imported 
product) only, and not with respect to income from other 
commercial fishing activity.418  The CIT and the Federal Circuit 
disagreed.  The CIT and the Federal Circuit found that the term “net 
farm income” in the Trade Act includes (for fishermen) net income 
from all fishing activity based on a plain meaning of the term, the 
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goals that Congress intended the statute to promote (namely, to 
adjust production to avoid the impact of competing imported goods), 
and the Agriculture Department’s reasonable definition of the 
term.419  Therefore, as Mr. Steen’s net farm income from all fishing 
activities was higher in 2002 than his net fishing income in 2001, the 
Federal Circuit upheld the CIT’s decision upholding the Agriculture 
Department’s denial of cash benefits for Mr. Steen.420 
In Former Employees of Quality Fabricating, Inc. v. United States Secretary 
of Labor,421 the Federal Circuit held that the CIT did not possess 
jurisdiction to consider the Department of Labor’s (“Labor’s”) 
determination on secondarily-affected worker benefit eligibility for 
former employees of Quality Fabricating, Inc. (“Quality”).422  
Secondarily-affected workers are workers whose employers were 
indirectly affected by increased imports from or shifts of production 
to other countries.423  In this case, the Federal Circuit found that the 
CIT lacked jurisdiction to review Labor’s determination because the 
CIT did not have jurisdiction to review all of Labor’s determinations, 
administration, and enforcement of trade adjustment assistance 
certifications, and “no statute waives immunity nor authorizes suit in 
the court of International Trade with respect to Labor’s 
determinations on secondarily-affected worker benefits.”424 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit addressed a wide range of international trade 
issues during 2003-2006 and, in so doing, clarified trade practice and 
law involving matters before Customs, Commerce, the ITC and 
USTR, as well as for the CIT.  Interestingly, in reviewing the cases 
summarized above, the Federal Circuit more often affirmed the CIT 
in this period in cases involving Customs than in cases involving 
Commerce or the ITC, perhaps reflecting the relative complexity and 
extensive procedural history of some of the Commerce and ITC 
unfair trade cases in comparison with the Customs matters addressed 
by the CIT and Federal Circuit during this period.  Overall, the 
Federal Circuit issued well-reasoned and thoughtful decisions 
involving international trade during 2003-2006, with many of those 
decisions likely to have an important impact on the practice of 
international trade law in the years to come.  
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